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THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE FUTURE OF
PRIVACY LAW IN MAINE
Scott Bloomberg*
ABSTRACT
In the United States, privacy law has traditionally developed in concert with
intrusions created by newfangled technologies. This pattern has held true in Maine.
Beginning in the late 1960s, the state has experienced three eras of privacy reform
that track the technological advances of the mid-century, the internet era, and the
new era of social media and big data. This Article details these eras of reform and
advances several proposals for responding to the challenges posed by the present era.
Indeed, at the beginning of the 2020s, there is much work on the horizon to
ensure that Maine’s privacy laws keep up with new technological and social
developments. The coronavirus pandemic looms large over all facets of society and
privacy law is no exception. The pandemic had made us even more reliant on online
services that collect, use, and share previously unfathomable quantities of data,
leaving residents’ personal information vulnerable to misuse. Increased attention to
racial injustice and over-policing in the wake of George Floyd’s tragic murder have
likewise highlighted privacy issues with which Maine must continue to grapple.
Finally, Northeastern University recently opened the Roux Institute in Portland,
offering various graduate-level degrees pertaining to the practical application of
artificial intelligence and machine learning in the digital and life sciences. This
development offers exciting educational and economic opportunities for the state,
but also indicates that regulating AI and machine-learning technologies will be
important to preserving Mainers’ privacy rights in the near future. All of these recent
challenges, moreover, have emerged against the backdrop of the existing privacy
threats posed by social media, big data, mass surveillance, and more.
This Article is thus well-timed to inform those who will be tasked with shaping
Maine privacy law in the coming years and decades. In Part II of the Article, I detail
the three eras of reform highlighted above. In Part III, I propose that Maine enact a
general consumer privacy law endowing Mainers with certain rights to their personal
information, vesting consumer privacy rulemaking authority in a state agency,
regulating automated decision-making technologies, and more. After proposing the
general consumer privacy law, I identify five privacy threats that warrant additional
attention from the legislature: facial recognition technology; biometric information;
smart-home devices; data brokers; and the Maine Information and Analysis Center.
Part IV briefly concludes the Article.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. I thank Cindy Hirsch for her
excellent research assistance with this project, Stephen Stich and Brendan McQuade for their input on
earlier drafts of this paper, the staff of the Maine Law Review for their superb editorial work, and Maine
State Rep. Maggie O’Neil for introducing legislation that adopts many of this paper’s recommendations.
Any errors are my own. As always, I owe the deepest debt of gratitude to my wife, Amber, without
whose support this paper would not have been possible. Finally, I dedicate this Article to my daughter,
Lyla. May you grow up in a society that safeguards your privacy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The body of privacy law in the United States is a mosaic of reforms enacted in
response to privacy intrusions posed by technological advances. This was true from
the body’s ostensible birth in 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued
for a right to privacy in light of the new cameras that had “invaded the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life,” and the “numerous mechanical devices” that
threatened to “make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall
be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”1 By the 1960s, advances in technology
promised to expose even the most intimate areas of life. Gadgets like hidden cameras
and discreet recording devices allowed eavesdroppers to capture conversations and
images without being noticed, while inventions like the polygraph, personality tests,
and subliminal messaging threatened to reveal the mind’s inner-workings.2 Local
governments, state governments, and the federal government responded to these new
technologies by adopting reforms that are now considered foundational to privacy
law.3
The expansion of the internet and mass-computing in the 1990s led to a
multitude of new privacy issues regarding personal information. Details once
considered beyond public reach could be accessed, searched, organized, and stored
by anyone with a desktop and a dial-up connection. Threats to privacy caused by
our new connectivity stirred legislatures to adopt laws governing unauthorized
computer access, data breaches, cyber-harassment, and much more.4 Today, the
ubiquity of social media, smart devices, big data, and machine learning have
accelerated the privacy concerns attendant to computers and the internet that began
to take hold in the 1990s. Governments are still grappling with how best to respond
to these new privacy risks.
This pattern of privacy law has held true in Maine. Since the late 1960s, the
state has experienced three eras of privacy reform that track the technological
advances of the mid-century, the internet era, and the new era of social media and
big data. This Article details these three eras of reform and advances a number of
proposals for responding to the challenges posed by the era that we are living through
today.
Indeed, at the beginning of the 2020s, there is much work on the horizon to
ensure that Maine’s privacy laws keep up with new technological and social
developments. The coronavirus pandemic looms large over all facets of society and
privacy law is no exception. The pandemic had made us even more reliant on online
services that collect, use, and share previously unfathomable quantities of data,
leaving residents’ personal information vulnerable to misuse. Increased attention to
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890).
2. See infra Section II(A). See generally ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967)
(detailing the privacy intrusions caused by post-WWII advances in technology and legislative responses
to those new advances); SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN
AMERICA (2018) (providing a history of how technology, science, and other factors have shaped
American privacy norms and expectations).
3. See infra Section II(A) (discussing reforms pertaining to eavesdropping, consumer reports,
polygraphs, and wiretapping).
4. See infra Section II(B).
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racial injustice and over-policing in the wake of George Floyd’s tragic murder have
likewise highlighted privacy issues with which Maine must continue to grapple.
Finally, Northeastern University recently opened the Roux Institute in Portland,
offering various graduate-level degrees pertaining to “the practical application of
artificial intelligence and machine learning in the digital and life sciences.” 5 This
development offers exciting educational and economic opportunities for the state,
but also indicates that regulating artificial intelligence (“AI”) and machine-learning
technologies will be important to preserving Mainers’ privacy rights in the near
future. All of these recent challenges, moreover, have emerged against the backdrop
of the existing privacy threats posed by social media, big data, mass surveillance,
and more.
This Article is thus well-timed to inform those who will be tasked with shaping
Maine privacy law in the coming years and decades. In Part II of the Article, I detail
the three eras of reform highlighted above. In Part III, I propose that Maine enact a
general consumer privacy law endowing Mainers with certain rights to their personal
information, vesting consumer privacy rulemaking authority in a state agency,
regulating automated decision-making technologies, and more. After proposing the
general consumer privacy law, I identify five privacy threats that warrant additional
attention from the legislature: facial recognition technology; biometric information;
smart-home devices; data brokers; and the Maine Information and Analysis Center.
Part IV briefly concludes the Article.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVACY LAW IN MAINE
Part II of this Article presents the first comprehensive account of the
development of Maine privacy law. I have organized this account into three
Sections, each tracking a wave of reform that the state enacted in response to
newfangled technologies. First, I discuss the state’s reforms during the late 1960s
and the 1970s. These reforms include core privacy protections such as recognizing
the invasion of privacy torts, criminalizing certain egregious violations of privacy,
and regulating wiretapping. Second, I detail Maine’s reforms during the 1990s and
early 2000s, when the popularization of the internet and the personal computer
(“PC”) led the state to update its earlier privacy laws and to enact new ones
addressing the privacy threats posed by this new form of mass communication.
Third, I review Maine’s more recent privacy reforms, which have primarily come in
response to privacy risks posed by social media and big data.
A. The Emergence of Privacy Law in Maine
By the mid-1900s, advances in technology threatened to unveil even the most
intimate areas of life. Gadgets like miniature cameras, wiretaps, and discreet
recording devices—which were marketed to the public as eavesdropping tools—

5. Ian Thomsen, Northeastern Partners with Entrepreneur David Roux to Launch the Roux
Institute at Northeastern in Portland, Maine, NE. UNIV. (Jan. 27, 2020), https://news.northeastern.edu/
2020/01/27/northeastern-partners-with-entrepreneur-david-roux-to-launch-the-roux-institute-atnortheastern-in-portland-maine/ [perma.cc/6EQ3-NBEG].
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allowed third parties to capture conversations and images without being noticed. 6 At
the same time as the privacy of traditionally non-public spaces and conversations
was being threatened, inventions like the polygraph, personality tests, and subliminal
messaging threatened to reveal Americans’ inner-most thoughts.7 Risks to
information privacy began to take focus during this era as well. Early data processing
and computing technologies led the pioneering privacy scholar Alan Westin to warn
against the privacy intrusions made possible by the collection and storage of large
amounts of information about peoples’ daily lives. 8
Maine responded to these threats by enacting a series of privacy laws that often
mirrored those passed in other states or at the federal level. From the late 1960s to
the late 1970s, the state passed laws addressing privacy issues attendant to
telephones, recording devices, wiretaps, polygraphs, private investigators, and
consumer reporting agencies. Additionally, during this initial era of privacy reform
in Maine, the Maine Law Court9 recognized four invasion of privacy torts that Maine
residents would come to assert in a variety of circumstances.
In 1967, Maine criminalized the “willful[], wanton[], or malicious[]” use of a
telephone to transmit communications that were “obscene, lewd, lascivious, or
indecent,” threated to injure “person or property,” or were repeated anonymous
telephone calls “which disturb[ed] the peace, quiet or right of privacy of any
person.”10 Maine’s “Act Prohibiting Annoying Telephone Calls” made the state one
of many in the country to address the privacy intrusions attendant to the widespread
use of telephones in the home: telemarketers and harassers could reach into nearly
anyone’s home at any hour of the day or night. 11 Violations of the Act carried
penalties of up to a $500 fine and eleven months’ imprisonment.12 Within two
decades, almost every state in the country had similar laws on the books.13
6. See, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 2, at 73-85 (describing various location, photography, and
eavesdropping technologies in use during the 1950s and 1960s).
7. Id. at 158-69 (discussing government and private use of the polygraph during the 1950s and
1960s); id. at 145-58 (discussing government and private use of the personality tests from the 1930s
through the 1960s); id. at 311-31 (reviewing the invention of subliminal messaging, the public response
thereto, and the debate over the invention’s effectiveness).
8. See id. at ch. 7, The Revolution in Information Collection and Processing: Data Surveillance
(discussing the use of computers and data processing to create large personal dossiers and to record
financial transactions, and warning of the dangers posed by the use of centralized data processing
technology to create a universal credit system).
9. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court is called the “Law Court” when sitting in an appellate
capacity. See Supreme Judicial Court, STATE OF ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.courts.maine.
gov/courts/sjc/index.html [https://perma.cc/NC79-TTRT] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
10. Me. P.L. 1967, ch. 176.
11. See Andrea J. Robinson, Note, A Remedial Approach to Harassment, 70 VA. L. REV. 507, 52224 & n.75 (1984) (discussing statutes directed at combating telephonic harassment and noting that by
1964 American Law Reports had published an annotation on misuse of the telephone as a minor
criminal offense).
12. Me. P.L. 1967, ch. 176.
13. See Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the Right of Privacy, 4
YALE J. ON REGUL. 99, 106 (1986) (“Forty-five states have laws that prohibit harassment by telephone
calls made with the purpose, intent, or knowledge that the call will annoy.”). Another account from
1984 concludes that every state had laws prohibiting “at least some types of telephone misuse.”
Robinson, supra note 11, at 522 & App. Many telephone harassment laws were declared
unconstitutional based on First Amendment overbreadth or vagueness concerns, although courts are
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Maine significantly revised the state’s annoying telephone calls law when the
legislature enacted Maine’s criminal code in 1975. Section 506 of the code
prohibited harassment “by means of telephone,” and perhaps in response to
constitutional challenges to similar laws in other states, provided a more tailored
definition of that crime than did the 1967 Act.14 The revised law prohibited, inter
alia: obscene calls made “without consent of the person called”; anonymous calls
made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass”; and repeated calls made with
intent to harass.15
Around the same time as Maine was adopting protections for recipients of
annoying or harassing phone calls, the state also acted to protect those whose calls
were being intercepted by third parties. In 1973, Maine followed the federal
government and several other states in enacting the Interception of Wire and Oral
Communications Act.16 The Act protected the privacy of telephone (wire) and inperson (oral) communications by criminalizing the interception of both types of
communications.17 As a prophylactic measure to guard against this core privacy
protection, the Act also prohibited the willful disclosure or use of communications
known to have been unlawfully intercepted, as well as the possession and sale of
devices used for intercepting wire and oral communications.18 And, the Act imposed
an affirmative duty on telephone companies to report potential violations of the
law.19
The legislature enacted two significant privacy reforms during this era that
extended beyond the confines of privacy intrusions caused by misuse of the
telephone and to the realm of physical invasions of privacy. First, in 1971 the state
passed a law to regulate “professional investigators,” perhaps more commonly
generally divided on the constitutionality of such statutes. See generally M. Sean Royall, Comment,
Constitutionally Regulating Telephone Harassment: An Exercise in Statutory Precision, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1403 (1989) (reviewing courts’ treatment of laws criminalizing annoying or harassing telephone
calls under the First Amendment); Wayne F. Foster, Validity, Construction, and Application of State
Criminal Statute Forbidding Use of Telephone to Annoy or Harass, 95 A.L.R.3d 411 (originally
published in 1979) (collecting cases).
14. An Act Creating the Maine Criminal Code, Me. P.L. 1975, ch. 499, § 1 (codified as amended at
17-A M.R.S.A § 506(1)).
15. Id.
16. Me. P.L. 1973, ch. 561 (codified as amended at 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 709-712); see also Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (creating Chapter
119 of title 18 of the U.S. Code, titled “Wire Interception and Interception of Oral Communications”);
WESTIN, supra note 2, at 179-91 (discussing state wiretap reform laws in the 1950s and 1960s).
Maine’s prohibition on intercepting oral and wire communications contained certain exceptions
applicable to law enforcement and telephone companies. See Me. P.L. 1973, ch. 561 (codified as
amended at 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 710, 712).
17. See Me. P.L. 1973, ch. 561(codified as amended at 15 M.R.S.A. § 710) (criminalizing the
willful interception or attempted interception of oral or wire communications).
18. See id. The Act’s prohibitions are similar to the prohibitions contained in its federal
counterpart. See § 802, 82 Stat. at 212. The scope of the Act’s prohibitions and exceptions have been
modified since their original enactment, but remain largely the same as when they were originally
enacted in 1973. See 15 M.R.S. § 710 (2013) (using a “knowingly or intentionally” standard rather than
a “willfully” standard and including certain exceptions for investigative officers and Department of
Corrections employees).
19. Me. P.L. 1973, ch 561 (codified as amended at 15 M.R.S.A. § 710(4)) (imposing a duty to
report on communications common carriers).
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known as private investigators or “P.I.s.” By the late 1960s, approximately 20,000
Americans were employed as P.I.s working for “their own firms, for large detective
agencies, for insurance and credit companies, or as corporate security officers.” 20
Device manufacturers “aggressive[ly] promot[ed]” equipment such as “tapping
devices, miniature microphones, and cameras” to P.I.s, who purchased these devices
to surveil their targets.21 This technology gave P.I.s the ability to hide listening
devices in objects as small as “cigarette lighters, clasps of ladies’ handbags and
cigarette packs; two-inch ‘palm’ cameras; and similar equipment.” 22 P.I.s also
compiled personal information about their subjects by speaking to their subjects’
neighbors. “Suburbia was a treasure trove of information for those with a financial
stake in personal ‘character’ and habits . . . so agents roamed residential
neighborhoods in search of peers who would talk.” 23
The growth of the P.I. industry and investigators’ use of such intrusive devices
contributed to the genuine—and justified—paranoia about who may be watching,
listening, or snooping on Americans. 24 This paranoia led to both the enactment of
state laws regulating private investigators and to the wiretapping laws discussed
above. Maine’s P.I. law, “An Act Relating to the Regulation of Private Detectives,”
imposed a licensing requirement on P.I.s and prohibited P.I.s from taking certain
actions to disrupt or incite labor strikes, interfere with labor negotiations, or attempt
to break-up labor unions.25 Today, forty-five states have laws regulating and
licensing P.I.s.26
Second, the state created a violation of privacy crime in 1975.27 The law was
designed to protect the privacy of people while they were in “private places,” defined
to mean “a place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from surveillance.”28
The legislature accordingly made it a crime to trespass on property “with intent to
overhear or observe any person in a private place,” to install or use “any device for
20. WESTIN, supra note 2, at 97.
21. See id. at 98.
22. Id.
23. IGO, supra note 2, at 114.
24. See, e.g., id. at 114 (“The sudden uptick in the use of private investigators (in the 1950s) was of
special concern.”).
25. See Me. P.L. 1971, ch. 582, § 1 (codified as amended at 32 M.R.S.A. § 3809 (repealed 1977))
(listing prohibited conduct).
26. See State-by-State Private Investigator Licensing Requirements, PURSUIT MAG., https://
pursuitmag.com/resources/investigator-licensing/ [https://perma.cc/5UFG-SPVY] (last visited Nov. 15,
2020) (compiling state licensing requirements).
27. An Act Creating the Maine Criminal Code, Me. P.L. 1975, ch. 499 (codified as amended at 17A M.R.S.A.). For an overview of state laws criminalizing similar invasions of privacy, see Lance E.
Rothenberg, Comment, Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and Failure of the
Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space, 49 AM. U. L. REV.
1127, 1142-44 (2000), noting that “the criminalization of privacy intrusion is firmly established in many
state penal codes, falling under a wide variety of crimes,” and collecting state statutes regarding
different types of privacy intrusions.
28. Me. P.L. 1975, ch. 499, § 1 (codified as amended at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 511). The definition of
“private place” exempted “a place to which the public or a substantial group has access.” The law thus
did not protect the privacy of conversations that occurred in places like bars and restaurants, even if it
would have been reasonable to expect privacy from surveillance in such places. As discussed infra
Section II(B), the legislature would remove this exception and revise the definition of “private places”
decades later.
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observing, photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or events”
in private places without consent, and to install or use outside of a private place
devices designed for “hearing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds
originating” from the private place.29
The state also acted to regulate the use of polygraphs, which not only posed
challenging problems for criminal procedure30 but were also commonly used to pry
and embarrass women and suspected homosexuals about their intimate thoughts and
behaviors. By the 1960s, polygraph testing was widely used by police departments
and federal agencies for investigative purposes.31 Commercial uses of the polygraph
had grown in popularity too. Beyond using polygraphs to investigate commercial
crimes such as embezzlement, companies and government employers required
prospective employees to take polygraph exams and subjected existing employees to
periodic polygraphs to deter misconduct. 32 Tests were given in the employment
context to vet employees for promotions, assess employee attitudes about coworkers, and to determine how happy workers were with their jobs.33 Government
employees, and employees of government contractors, were additionally subjected
to “loyalty checks” using polygraph machines. 34
The content covered in these tests was wide-ranging and intrusive. For example,
in the 1950s the National Security Agency (“NSA”) made it a practice to use an
“Embarrassing Personal Question” or “EPQ” technique to vet prospective
employees.35 Common questions directed to women reportedly included “[h]ave you
ever slept with a man?” and “[d]id you sleep with your husband before you were
married?”36 During Congressional hearings on the use of polygraph examinations in
1964, one congressman recounted the story of a seventeen-year-old typist at the
NSA, who “became quite disturbed when she was asked a series of questions about
homosexual activity by the male operator administering the test while the two were
alone in the polygraph examining room.” 37 Private-sector employers abused the new
technology as well, using polygraph tests to ask employees about “union activities,
29. Me. P.L. 1975, ch 499, § 1 (codified as amended at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 511). The statute
exempted people acting “in the execution of a public duty or as authorized by law.” Id. § 1 (codified as
amended at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 511(1)).
30. As early as 1954, the Law Court had “consistently ruled that not only are polygraph tests
inadmissible, but also that evidence that a defendant agreed to take a polygraph test, or refused to take
such test, is not admissible.” State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 283 (Me. 1975) (citing State v. Casale,
110 A.2d 588 (Me. 1954); State v. Mottram, 184 A.2d 225 (Me. 1962); State v. Mower, 314 A.2d 840
(Me. 1974)).
31. See, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 2, at 158-59 (estimating that over half of the police departments
in the United States were using polygraphs and noting that in 1963 thirteen federal agencies
administered a total of 12,000 polygraph tests).
32. See id. at 160-63 (discussing the widespread use of polygraph examinations for personnel
sorting in private industry); id. at 164-69 (discussing how local, state, and the federal government used
polygraphs for employment purposes).
33. See generally id. at 160-169 (discussing the polygraph’s use as a personnel sorter).
34. Id. at 161 (noting that polygraphs were used by government contractors to administer polygraph
examinations); id. at 165-67 (summarizing a polygraph examination given to a prospective NSA
employee that probed the subject’s sympathies toward communism).
35. Id. at 167.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 168.
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personal finances, past employment and future job plans, drinking habits, physical
condition, police record, driving habits, sexual activities, and political beliefs.” 38
These disturbing abuses led states to begin restricting the use of polygraph tests.
By 1966, ten states had banned the use of polygraphs as a condition of employment,
while six other states had enacted licensing requirements for polygraph examiners. 39
Maine followed these early-moving states in 1979 by enacting the “Act to
Establish Registration of Polygraph Examiners.” 40 The Act made it unlawful for
polygraph examiners to “ask any questions pertaining to sexual behavior of any type
or questions that could be construed as being sexually oriented,” to “probe the
political or religious beliefs of any individual,” and to “subject a person to a
polygraph examination without that person’s full knowledge and consent.” 41 The
Act further prohibited the use of polygraphs for preemployment screening and for
employment purposes.42 The grounds for revoking or suspending a license provided
additional privacy protections for subjects of polygraph examinations. 43 Examiners
were subject to penalties against their license for failing to disclose the nature of the
examination and the specific questions to be asked; that the examination was
voluntary; that the subject had rights to refuse and terminate the examination; that
the subject had a constitutional right against self-incrimination; for asking prohibited
sexual questions; for not giving the subject an opportunity to offer explanations for
their responses; for conducting an examination to interfere with or prevent the lawful
activities of a labor union; and more.44
Toward the end of this initial era of privacy reform in Maine, the legislature
enacted the Maine Fair Credit Reporting Act (“Maine FCRA”), the first law in the
state that attempted to tackle privacy intrusions caused by the amassing and analysis
of large quantities of personal information by the private sector.45 By the 1970s,
advances in computing and data-processing technologies had allowed commercial
actors to collect and compile information files on consumers for use in determining
credit-worthiness, insurability, eligibility for employment, and more.46 The agencies

38. Id. at 243.
39. See id. at 244, 251 (noting that by 1965, Massachusetts, Oregon, Rhode Island, California,
Washington, and Alaska had banned the use of polygraph tests in employment, while New Jersey,
Maryland, Hawaii, and Delaware followed suit in 1966); id. at 246 (stating that Illinois, Kentucky, New
Mexico, North Dakota, and Texas had established licensing laws by 1966).
40. An Act to Establish Registration of Polygraph Examiners, Me. P.L. 1979, ch. 209, § 2 (codified
as amended at 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 7351-7390).
41. See id. (codified as amended at 32 M.R.S.A. § 7154). The prohibition on asking sexual
questions contains exceptions for certain criminal investigations and civil litigation where sexual
behavior is at issue. Id.
42. Id. (codified as amended at 32 M.R.S.A. § 7166).
43. Id. (codified as amended at 32 M.R.S.A. § 7161).
44. Id.
45. An Act to Establish the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Me. P.L. 1977, ch. 514, amended by An Act
to Clarify and Define Certain Existing Provisions of the Maine Fair Credit Reporting Act, Me. P.L.
1977, ch. 677.
46. See, e.g., Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008)
(noting that in enacting the FCRA, “Congress understood how the computerization of personal
information estranged individuals from their personal information, leading to a loss of control over
data”).
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that prepared these consumer reports were largely unregulated.47 Information from
their reports could be obtained through “deliberate misrepresentation,” files could
contain “false or fabricated material,” and consumers would have no recourse when
they were denied financial services or employment based on the contents of their
files.48 Indeed, consumers were often left in the dark about what information their
report contained, the basis for any adverse action taken due to information contained
in the report, and even the very existence of a report.49 Consumer reporting agencies
were thus widely seen as “unaccountable gatekeepers”50 sorely in need of regulation.
Maine took action against the consumer reporting industry in 1977, seven years
after the federal government enacted the era’s first and only federal law to “rein in
private sector data practices”51: the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970
(“Federal FCRA”).52 Finding it necessary to “insure that consumer reporting
agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect
for the consumer’s right to privacy,” Congress passed the Federal FCRA to create
some basic transparency requirements and safeguards for consumers. 53 The Federal
FCRA limited the purposes for which a consumer report could be used; 54 restricted
agencies’ use of older adverse information;55 established requirements for disclosing
information to consumers;56 created a procedure for consumers to dispute the
accuracy of information contained in a report;57 and imposed disclosure obligations
on users of reports when they made a decision adverse to the consumer based on the
contents of a report.58
Maine’s FCRA largely mirrored the federal version but provided the state’s
47. See, e.g., Christopher P. Guzelian et al., Credit Scores, Lending, and Psychosocial Disability,
95 B.U. L. REV. 1807, 1811 (2015) (“Until 1970, CRAs were unregulated. Complaints of abusive,
opaque, and false estimations of creditworthiness which affected banks' and merchants' lending
decisions were widespread, despite consumers' growing reliance upon credit to provide staples of daily
life.”); Lea Shepard, Toward a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm, 53 B.C. L. REV.
1695, 1744-45 (2012) (“In passing the FCRA, Congress sought to correct key defects in the procedures
by which the previously unregulated credit reporting industry operated. The industry was secretive and
enigmatic. Consumers did not know when and by whom their credit reports were being utilized.
Consumers had no access to their consumer reports. In addition, they could not correct incomplete,
irrelevant, or obsolete information.”).
48. IGO, supra note 2, at 229.
49. See, e.g., Shepard, supra note 47, at 1745 (describing consumer reporting agencies’ poor
practices and commenting that “job applicants had no idea that adverse and frequently erroneous or
subjective information in their consumer reports might be ‘controlling their troubled careers’”).
50. IGO, supra note 2, at 229.
51. Id. (referring to the FCRA as the era’s only law regulating private-sector data practices).
52. See Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189, 192-94 (Me. 1980) (summarizing the federal
and state acts and concluding that “the Maine Act paralleled the Federal Act,” with some exceptions);
see also Pub. L. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1114, 1127-36 (1970) (amending the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, Pub. L. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968)).
53. Pub. L. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (1970) ( “Findings and purpose”).
54. Id. § 604 (limiting use of consumer reports to credit transactions, employment purposes,
insurance, certain government licenses and benefits, and other “legitimate businesses need[s]”).
55. Id. § 605 (prohibiting consumer reporting agencies from using older information such as
bankruptcies older than fourteen years old or tax liens older than seven years).
56. See id. §§ 606, 609, 610 (establishing several disclosure requirements).
57. Id. § 611.
58. Id. § 615(a) (requiring, in such situations, users to disclose the name and address of the
consumer reporting agency and the nature of adverse information contained in a report to consumers).
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residents with some additional privacy protections. As the Law Court explained in
Equifax Services v. Cohen:
Whereas the Federal Act requires specific notice be given to a consumer before a
user can procure an “investigative consumer report,”[59] the Maine Act prohibits a
user from procuring such a report until prior written authorization of the consumer
is obtained. In addition, the Maine Act provides for many more absolute
prohibitions against the reporting of information. Whole categories of information,
such as race, religion, political affiliation and beliefs, and so forth, are classified as
prohibited and to be excluded from reports. . . . Maine requires that “investigative
consumer reports be written”, whereas the Federal Act allows them to be oral. The
Maine Act fails to confer the qualified immunity given by the Federal Act relative
to consumer suits against designated persons for defamation, invasion of privacy or
negligence with respect to the reporting of information.60

In Equifax Services, the Law Court reviewed a series of challenges to the Maine
FCRA brought by the credit reporting agency Equifax. Maine’s attempts to provide
its residents with protections beyond what the Federal FCRA provided received a
mixed airing. The Law Court upheld Maine’s requirement that investigative
consumer reports be written, 61 and it upheld the state’s decision not to confer
qualified immunity upon consumer reporting agencies, persons who furnish
information to such agencies, and users of consumer reports. 62 However, the court
found that the Maine FCRA’s provision requiring users to obtain a subject’s consent
before using an investigative consumer report—rather than requiring the user to only
notify the subject, as the Federal FCRA required—violated the First Amendment’s
speech clause.63 In reaching this decision, the Law Court rejected the Attorney
General’s position that the government’s interest in protecting privacy justified the
consent requirement. The court opined that privacy is “an elusive concept,” and that
only particular “‘zones’ or ‘areas’” of privacy fall within the government’s
“substantial” interest in protecting privacy. 64 The privacy protected by requiring
users to obtain consent from the subject of a consumer report before using that report
did not justify the restraints on speech imposed by the requirement.65
The Equifax Services court similarly found that the Maine FCRA’s prohibition
on the use of the sensitive information listed in 10 M.R.S.A. § 1321 implicated First
Amendment speech rights and was not justified by a sufficient government interest.66
59. An investigative consumer report is a specific type of consumer report that includes
information “bearing on a consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics or mode of
living which is obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends or associates.” Me. P.L.
1977, ch. 514 (codified as amended at 10 M.R.S.A. § 1312(7) (repealed 2013)).
60. Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189, 193-94 (Me. 1980) (internal citations omitted).
61. Id. at 212.
62. Id. at 213-15.
63. Id. at 200 (“Section 1314(1) must be held unconstitutional because either: (1) the restraint it
imposes really does not at all further a substantial governmental interest or (2) if we acknowledge that
the restraint may have a degree of relation to a substantial governmental interest . . . the restraint does
not directly advance that substantial interest and is more extensive than is necessary to serve it.”).
64. Id. at 199-200.
65. Id. at 200.
66. See id. at 195 (concluding that “[s]ections 1314 and 1321 . . . [are] direct restrictions upon
speech based upon the content of that speech”).
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Although it would be illegal for the user of a credit report to rely on some of the
categories of information proscribed by section 1321—such as race and religion—
in making decisions regarding creditworthiness, employment, housing, and public
accommodation, it was not illegal for a consumer agency to report those
characteristics.67 Nor was it illegal for a user to be aware of those characteristics.
As the court concluded, “[i]t is only when the user bases a discriminatory decision
on such factors that illegal activity occurs, and nothing in evidence shows that users
are generally susceptible to improper influence merely by becoming aware of
them.”68
Beyond statutory reforms, the Law Court created significant common-law
protections for individual privacy during this era. In Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt,
the court formally recognized a “right to privacy” and declared that violation of the
“legally protected right is an actionable tort.”69 In doing so, the Law Court joined a
majority of other states in recognizing the four privacy torts that derive from
Brandeis and Warren’s seminal article, “The Right to Privacy.” 70 As the court
explained:
The law of privacy addresses the invasion of four distinct interests of the individual.
Each of the four different interests, taken as a whole, represent an individual's right
‘to be let alone.’ These four kinds of invasion are:
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical and mental solitude or seclusion;
(2) public disclosure of private facts;
(3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye;
(4) appropriation for the defendant’s benefit or advantage of the plaintiff’s name or
likeness.71

Plaintiffs in Maine have since asserted the torts—usually unsuccessfully in
reported cases—in a range of situations, including: the unauthorized publication of
an infant child’s photograph;72 portraying a corporation in false light;73 the disclosure
of settlement terms;74 the unauthorized viewing of a woman giving birth;75 the
disclosure and use of private information during probate proceedings;76 and
67. See id. at 203, 204-05.
68. Id. at 205.
69. 365 A.2d 792, 794 (Me. 1976).
70. Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 794 (Me. 1976) (noting that a majority of other
jurisdictions in the country had recognized the privacy rights); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383, 389 (1960) (dividing Brandeis and Warren’s proposed invasion of privacy tort into four
distinct torts).
71. Estate of Berthiaume, 365 A.2d at 795.
72. Nelson v. Me. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1222 (Me. 1977) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs’
claims).
73. Hearts With Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, No. 2:13-CV-00039, 2015 WL 3649592, at * 8 (D. Me.
June 9, 2015) (finding that the Law Court would not allow a corporation to bring a false light invasion
of privacy claim).
74. Loe v. Town of Thomaston, 600 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me. 1991) (affirming dismissal of invasion
of privacy claim).
75. Knight v. Penobscot Bay Med. Ctr., 420 A.2d 915, 917-18 (Me. 1980). The jury in this case
found for the defendants and the Law Court affirmed the trial court’s jury instructions on appeal. Id. at
916.
76. Bratt v. Jensen Baird Gardner & Henry, P.A., No. 2:17-CV-463, 2018 WL 4568590, at * 1 (D.
Me. Sept. 24, 2018) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss).

2021]

DEVELOPMENT & FUTURE OF PRIVACY LAW IN MAINE

227

disclosure of a person’s HIV status. 77
***
By the end of the 1970s, Maine had established basic safeguards from the
intrusions on its residents’ privacy posed by the technologies of the day. People who
invaded the sanctity of the home through repeated or harassing phone calls or by
employing discreet surveillance devices could be prosecuted under criminal laws.
The state’s prohibition on intercepting wire and oral communications and its
regulation of private investigators, polygraph examiners, and consumer reporting
agencies combined to guard Mainers against the use of intrusive, unfair, and
unethical practices in collecting personal information. And, the Law Court’s
recognition of the four privacy torts gave Mainers civil recourse against individuals
and companies who violated their right to privacy.
Within a decade, advances in technology would reveal a clear need to
supplement these foundational privacy protections.
B. Reforms for the Internet Era
The expansion of the internet and mass-computing beginning around 1990 and
extending through the early 2010s led to increased awareness of privacy issues
regarding personal information. Information that was once considered beyond
public reach was suddenly available to anyone with computer and internet access,
large quantities of personal information could be readily stored in hackable electronic
databases, and private information could be posted and shared on publicly available
forums without the subject’s consent. Maine’s laws, like the laws of its sister states
and the federal government, were not equipped to protect its residents’ privacy
interests from these new threats. The sometimes obvious shortcomings, together
with well-publicized privacy intrusions from around the country, prompted the state
to act. During this second era of privacy reform in Maine, the state passed laws
criminalizing the unauthorized access of a computer, prohibiting cyberstalking,
expanding the state’s criminal invasion of privacy law, requiring businesses (and
certain other persons) to report data breaches, prohibiting the sale of consumers’ cell
phone records, and more.
The beginning of the state’s internet-era reforms can be marked by Maine’s 1990
enactment of Chapter 18 of the criminal code: “Computer Crimes.”78 The Chapter
included two crimes. First, a person was guilty of “criminal invasion of computer
privacy” if they “intentionally access[ed] any computer resource knowing that [they

77. Stokes v. Barnhart, 257 F. Supp. 2d 288, 295 (D. Me. 2003) (dismissing the claim because the
defendant only disclosed the plaintiff’s HIV status to a single person).
78. Me. P.L. 1989, ch. 620. Previous versions of this bill died in the legislature after some
commenters voiced concerns that the prohibitions on unauthorized computer access swept too broadly.
See An Act Relating to Computer Access: Hearing on L.D. 627 Before the J. Standing Comm. on
Judiciary, 114th Legis. 13-19 (1989) (detailing the opposition to a similar bill, L.D. 36 (1985)),
available from Me. State Law & Leg. Reference Library by requesting cf114-LD-0627.pdf.
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were] not authorized to do so.”79 Second, a person was guilty of “aggravated
criminal invasion of computer privacy” if they knowingly: (a) copied any computer
program, software, or information without authorization; (b) damaged any computer
resource without having the right to do so; or (c) introduced a virus into a computer
without having the right to do so.80 At the time of enactment, at least twenty-three
other states had similar laws on the books. 81
Stalking is one of the most serious privacy intrusions people experience, and the
use of computers and the internet exacerbates the problem. Beginning in 1990, states
across the country began enacting laws that made stalking a specific criminal
offense.82 Although Maine had other laws, such as a law prohibiting terrorizing, that
may have encompassed some stalking behavior, the state did not recognize stalking
as a separate offense until 1996, becoming the last state in the nation to do so. 83
Maine’s stalking statute followed the National Institute of Justice’s Model AntiStalking Code for States,84 criminalizing the following conduct:
1. A person is guilty of stalking if:
A. The person intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed
at another specific person that would in fact cause a reasonable person:
(1) To suffer intimidation or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm;
(2) To fear bodily injury or to fear bodily injury to a member of that person’s
immediate family; or
(3) To fear death or to fear the death of a member of that person’s immediate
family; and
B. The person’s course of conduct in fact causes the other specific person [to suffer
those harms].85

Importantly, the statute defined “course of conduct” to encompass “gaining
unauthorized access to personal, medical, financial or other identifying information,
including access by computer network.” 86 An interview with the bill’s sponsor,
79. Me. P.L. 1989, ch. 620 (codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 432). The term “computer resources” was
defined to encompass computer programs, software, systems, networks, and information. Id. (codified
as amended at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 431).
80. Id. (codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 433).
81. An Act Relating to Computer Access: Hearing on L.D. 627 Before the J. Standing Comm. on
Judiciary, 114th Leg. 6 (Me. 1989).
82. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STALKING, AND
ANTISTALKING LEGISLATION: AN ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN ACT 1 (1996) (“The first State antistalking laws were passed in 1990.”).
83. See Me. P.L. 1995, ch. 668, § 3 (creating the offense of stalking); NAT’L INST. OF JUST., supra
note 82, at 7 (noting that Maine used an anti-terrorizing statute to address stalking behavior); 6 Legis.
Rec. H-1857 (2d Reg. Sess. 1996) (remarks of Representative Saxl) (stating that “49 other states in this
country saw fit to adopt legislation which would identify stalking as a crime”). Notably, the Office of
the Maine Attorney General disputed the characterization that Maine was the last state in the country to
criminalize stalking, apparently believing that Maine’s anti-terrorizing statute or its laws regarding
protective orders encompassed the criminal offense. See Renee Ordway, Legislator pushing bill on
stalking, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 10, 1996), https://archive.bdnblogs.com/1996/01/10/legislatorpushing-bill-on-stalking-act-would-become-crime/ [https://perma.cc/43BH-WFAA].
84. See Nat’l Crim. Just. Ass’n, PROJECT TO DEVELOP A MODEL ANTI-STALKING CODE FOR
STATES, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (Oct. 1993).
85. Me. P.L. 1995, ch. 668, § 3 (codified as amended at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 210-A).
86. Id.

2021]

DEVELOPMENT & FUTURE OF PRIVACY LAW IN MAINE

229

Representative Saxl, shows that the legislature was particularly concerned with how
advances in computer technologies would facilitate stalking. Saxl remarked that the
anti-stalking legislation would “make it a crime to invade the lives of victims via
computer; by using computer mail or other computer-aided ways to invade a person’s
bank records, credit card statements and the like, and then using that type of
information in the harassment of the individual.” 87 He also noted that such problems
“have occurred in Maine already,” and he anticipated the problem would worsen
with “increased computer access.”88
The legislature would return to the anti-stalking law twice during this era of
reform. Both times, the legislature amended the law to account for the use of new
technologies to stalk victims in Maine. The 2001 Act to Prohibit Cyberstalking
clarified that Maine’s stalking law prohibited the conveyance of oral or written
threats by “electronic means.”89 Then, as part of a larger legislative effort to
strengthen the state’s anti-stalking law in 2007-2008, the legislature redefined
“course of conduct” to include “2 or more acts, including but not limited to acts in
which the actor, by any action, method, device or means, directly or indirectly
follows, monitors, tracks, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses or communicates to
or about a person or interferes with a person’s property.” 90 The bill also included a
legislative intent section to explain that the revisions were:
drafted broadly to capture all stalking activity, including a stalker’s use of new
technologies. Presently, some stalkers use Global Positioning Satellite technology
to monitor actions, disposable cell phones to make untraceable calls and keyloggers
to capture private information from computers. In the future, new technologies not
currently imagined will be used to the same ends. The Legislature intends that the
use of such new technology be covered by this legislation.91

Maine also revised its Criminal Invasion of Privacy law to account for changes
in technology during this time. In 1996, police arrested a Lisbon man who had
surreptitiously taken up-skirt videos of women and girls at a bookstore and in other
public places.92 The man had jerry-rigged a briefcase to camouflage a small video
camera, which he would place on the ground near where his victims were standing. 93
The incident posed a problem for prosecutors: the criminal invasion of privacy
statute only applied to “private places” and the man’s conduct did not fit into any
other crime enumerated by the state’s criminal code.94 While the man was eventually
convicted for criminal invasion of privacy after the judge stretched the statute to

87. Ordway, supra note 83.
88. Id.
89. Me. P.L. 2001, ch, 411, § 1.
90. Me. P.L. 2007, ch. 685, § 1.
91. Id.
92. See Robert George, Bill Targets High-tech Lewdness, BRUNSWICK TIMES REC. 2 (Feb. 2,
1997), available from Me. State Law & Leg. Reference Library by requesting 118/LD00xx/nc118LD0036/SB118640.pdf.
93. Id.
94. See An Act to Criminalize Unpermitted Visual Surveillance under the Clothing of a Person in a
Public Place by Mechanical or Electronic Equipment: Hearing on L.D. 0036 Before J. Standing Comm.
on Criminal Justice, 118th Legis. 9-10 (1997) (letter from Assistant Dist. Att. Carlos Diaz to victim’s
mother), available from Me. State Law & Leg. Reference Library by requesting cf118-LD-036.pdf.
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reach his conduct,95 the legislature was concerned that the case revealed a gap in the
criminal code caused by the advance in video-recording technology. The state thus
added a new clause to its criminal invasion of privacy statute, making it a crime to
engage:
in visual surveillance in a public place by means of mechanical or electronic
equipment with the intent to observe or photograph, or record, amplify or broadcast
an image of any portion of the body of another person present in that place when
that portion of the body is in fact concealed from public view under clothing and a
reasonable person would expect it to be safe from surveillance. 96

The legislature would amend the criminal invasion of privacy statute twice more
during this era to provide additional privacy protections to Mainers. First, increased
use of surveillance cameras in retail establishments prompted the legislature to
specify that “private place” as defined by the statute included “changing or dressing
rooms, bathrooms and similar places.”97 Second, the legislature removed the
exception for places “to which the public or a substantial group has access” from the
definition of “private place,” such that a criminal invasion of privacy could occur by
conducting surveillance on someone while they are in a publicly accessible area,
provided that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that area. 98
To give its internet-era stalking and invasion of privacy reforms more teeth,
Maine added both crimes to the list of offenses that allow a victim to obtain a
Harassment Prevention Order.99 Maine’s Protection from Harassment statute, 5
M.R.S.A. §§ 4651-61, allows victims of harassment to obtain emergency protective
orders. The term “harassment” is defined to encompass several specific offenses—
which now include stalking and criminal invasion of privacy. The statute specifies
that a victim can obtain the order “in the District Court of the division in which either
the plaintiff or the defendant resides,” giving victims recourse when their harasser
resides outside of the state and torments them through the internet. 100
Beyond reforms to protect new intrusions on physical privacy made possible by
advances in computing and other technologies, Maine took several measures to
protect its residents’ information privacy from new and emerging threats. In 2005,
a data broker101 called ChoicePoint experienced a security breach that exposed
thousands of consumers’ personal information, including approximately 250
95. Id.
96. Me. P.L. 1997, ch. 467, § 1. The legislature also provided an affirmative defense to this new
crime for situations where the person was over 14 years old and consented to the surveillance. The
legislative materials that I have reviewed do not reveal why the legislature chose 14 years old as the
pertinent age of consent for this incredibly intrusive conduct, but that provision remains the law today.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 511(1-A) (2016).
97. Me. P.L. 1999, ch. 116, § 1.
98. Me. P.L. 2007, ch. 688, § 2 (amending the definition of “private place” as follows: “As used in
this section, "private place" means a place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from
surveillance, including, but not limited to, changing or dressing rooms, bathrooms and similar places,
but excluding a place to which the public or a substantial group has access.”).
99. Me. P.L. 2001, ch. 134, § 1.
100. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 4652 (2004).
101. For more information on data brokers, see infra Section III(B) (proposing that Maine regulate
data brokers by creating a data broker registry and giving consumers greater control over how data
brokers use their personal information).
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Mainers.102 This event drew the legislature’s attention to the growing problem of
data breaches and the risk of identity theft that results. 103 The legislature responded
to the incident by enacting a breach-notification law: “An Act To Protect Maine
Citizens from Identity Theft.”104 The Act applied only to “information brokers”—
companies that collected consumers’ personal information and then furnished that
information to third parties—and required such companies to notify Maine
consumers upon discovery of a data breach involving their personal information. 105
Violations of the Act were subject to civil penalties that could be enforced by the
Department of Professional and Financial Regulation (“DPFR”) or by the Attorney
General.106 The Act also required the DPFR to issue a report on data security and
security breaches to inform future changes to the Act. 107
The DPFR’s report contained two key recommendations. First, the report
advised that the Act be expanded to apply to all businesses (and certain other
persons)—not just information brokers.108 Second, the report recommended
establishing a “limited private cause of action” for actual damages caused by the
failure to investigate or timely notify consumers of a breach. 109 Maine swiftly
amended the breach notification law to adopt the former recommendation, but the
provision creating a limited private cause of action was removed in committee. 110
To this day, there is no private action for violations of Maine’s breach notification
law.111
102. See ME. DEP’T OF PRO. & FIN. REGUL, REP. OF THE DEP’T OF PRO. & FIN. REGUL. TO THE JOINT
STANDING COMM. ON INS. AND FIN. SERVS. ON P.L. 2005, CH. 379 “AN ACT TO PROTECT MAINE
CITIZENS FROM IDENTITY THEFT” 1 (2006), http://lldc.mainelegislature.org/Open/Meta/LegHist/122/lh1
22-LD-1671.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4UW-UXZ4] [hereinafter ME. DEP’T OF PRO. & FIN. REGUL. REP.].
103. Id.
104. Me. P.L. 2005, ch. 379.
105. Id. § 1.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See ME. DEP’T OF PRO. & FIN. REGUL. REP., supra note 102, at 6, 12. The report also
recommended that the state maintain more stringent notification requirements for information brokers.
Id. at 12. The State adopted that recommendation by requiring information brokers to provide notice
following a breach where a consumer’s “personal information has been, or is reasonably believed to
have been, acquired by an unauthorized person,” while subjecting other businesses to the ostensibly
lower standard of having to provide notice only when “misuse” of the personal information has occurred
or is “reasonably possible” to occur. 10 M.R.S.A. § 1348(1)(A)-(B). This distinction was likely more
imaginary than real, as misuse is almost always “reasonably possible” when an unauthorized personal
acquires a person’s personal information.
109. ME. DEP’T OF PRO. & FIN. REGUL. REP., supra note 102, at 12.
110. L.D. 2017, § 12 (122d Legis. 2006) (codified at 10 M.R.S.A. § 1350) (proposing a private right
of action). The legislature subsequently made minor revisions to strengthen its breach notification law
in 2007, 2009, and 2019. See Me. P.L. 2009, ch. 634, § 1 (codified at 10 M.R.S.A. § 1350-B) (requiring
law enforcement to issue police reports to persons whose personal information may have been misused
in a data breach); Me. P.L 2009, ch. 161, § 1 (codified at 10 M.R.S.A. § 1347(1)) (expanding the
definition of a security breach); Me. P.L. 2019, ch. 512, § 1 (codified at 10 M.R.S.A. § 1347(5))
(applying the law to municipalities and school administrative units).
111. See 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1346-1350-B (2006); see also In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data
Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 125 (D. Me. 2009) (noting that Maine’s breach notification
statute “does not recognize any private recovery.”). The State’s efforts to protect its residents from the
threat of identity theft posed by new computer technologies continued in 2007, when the legislature
enacted “An Act to Help Prevent Identity Theft.” Me. P.L. 2007, ch. 626 (codified at 33 M.R.S.A.
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Maine also took aim at the unauthorized sale of residents’ cell phone information
during this era. By 2005, some data brokers were acquiring and offering for sale
records of calls made to and from consumers’ cell phones. Maine law already
prohibited the sale of such records for landlines, but as Maine State Senator Bartlett
remarked on the Senate floor, “technology got a couple of steps ahead of us.”112 The
legislature thus passed the “Cellular Telephone Customer Privacy Act” to provide
civil and criminal penalties for selling, disclosing, or offering to sell or disclose call
records and other cell-phone information.113
Maine proved to be ahead of the curve on this issue. In 2006, the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce began investigating the
“activities of Internet-based data brokers who use lies, fraud, and deception to
procure . . . customer proprietary network information (CPNI) that is compiled by
cell phone carriers.”114 The Committee soon learned that investigators hired by the
Hewlett Packard Company (“HP”) to look into a boardroom leak used a data broker
to obtain cell phone call records of board members and reporters. 115 This revelation,
and the Committee’s broader investigation into data brokers’ practices, led to three
Committee hearings on data brokers’ collection of personal information, 116 criminal
charges against HP’s chairwoman (which were eventually dropped),117 and a $14.5
million settlement with the State of California.118 The incident also led the federal
government to enact the Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006,
prohibiting the fraudulent access of phone records and the unauthorized sale of such
records.119
The end of this era of privacy reform in Maine can be marked by two 2011 bills
designed to update Maine’s laws to account for the increased use of computers in
harassment. First, Maine’s 1975 law on annoying telephone calls, discussed supra
Section I(A), was badly in need of updating because, by the 2000s, harassing calls
were often placed from computers and not telephones. The legislature thus amended
section 506 of the criminal code to cover harassment “by electronic communication
device,” which it defined to include “any software capable of sending and receiving
communication.”120 Second, the national—and indeed global—nature of internet
privacy intrusions led the state to amend its criminal invasion of computer privacy
§651-B). This sensible piece of legislation allowed individuals to request that certain personal
information (social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, financial account numbers, and the like)
be redacted from records accessible through a registry of deeds website. Id. § 1.
112. Legis. Rec. S-1831 (2d Reg. Sess. 2006) (remarks of Sen. Bartlett).
113. Me. P.L. 2005, ch. 582.
114. Letter from Comm. on Energy & Com., to Patricia Dunn, Chairwoman of the Bd. of HewlettPackard Co. 1 (Sept. 11, 2006), https://web.archive.org/web/20061107225224/http://i.n.com.com/pdf/
ne/2006/househp_letter.pdf.
115. Id. at 1-2.
116. Internet Data Brokers: Who Has Access to Your Private Records?: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Energy & Com. H.R., 109th Cong. (2006).
117. Rob Kelley, Charges Against HP’s Dunn Dropped, CNN MONEY (Mar. 14, 2007, 7:51 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2007/03/14/technology/hpq/index.htm [https://perma.cc/TG4N-SX76].
118. Scott Horsley, HP to Pay $14.5 Million to Calif. In ‘Pretexting’ Case, NPR (Dec. 8, 2006, 6:00
AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6597192 [https://perma.cc/2KYS-T5P6].
119. Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-476, § 3, 120 Stat. 3568,
3569.
120. Me. P.L. 2011, ch. 464, § 14.
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crimes to specify that the state had jurisdiction to prosecute persons who committed
such crimes when they were physically located outside of the state, so long as the
victim was a Maine resident.121
***
By 2011, Maine had updated its existing laws and implemented new laws to
account for some of the privacy intrusions created or exacerbated by the large-scale
adoption of computers and the internet. However, there was much left unaddressed
by this era of reform. Social media, big data, machine learning, and other new
technologies were emerging and expanding rapidly. These new developments would
pose privacy threats that Maine’s internet-era reforms were ill-equipped to
remediate.
C. Reforms for the Era of Social Media, Big Data, and Machine Learning
From the early 2010s through present day, we have been living in an era where
the threats to individual privacies posed by technological advances are complex,
systemic, and rapidly evolving. While much has been written about these privacy
risks, Shoshana Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance Capitalism is perhaps the leading
account of the era.122 Zuboff describes the business models employed by participants
in what she calls the “surveillance economy.”123 Companies ranging from social
media platforms, to search engines, to manufacturers of “internet of things” (“IoT”)
devices provide services and products that collect massive amounts of data about
their users.124 This data serves as the “raw material[]” for machine-learning
“prediction products” that are designed to “forecast what we feel, think, and do: now,
soon, and later.”125 Surveillance capitalists then sell these prediction products to
advertisers who use the products to target their advertisements to the users who are
most likely to purchase their goods or services.126
The success of this economic model hinges on being able to accurately predict,
and indeed to positively shape, how users will behave. 127 Improving accuracy, in
turn, requires obtaining more and more data to feed the increasingly complex
121. Me. P.L. 2011, ch. 377, § 1. The state also amended the jurisdictional provisions of the
computer crimes law to specify that a prosecution could occur in the county where the defendant
accessed the computer resource or in the country in which the affected computer resource was located.
Me. P.L. 2011, ch. 133, § 1.
122. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 94 (2019).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 93-95 (describing how Google and other surveillance capitalists collect and monetize
users’ personal information).
125. Id. at 94-96.
126. Id. at 96. While advertisers are currently the primary customers in the surveillance capitalist
marketplace, Zuboff explains that there is no reason to expect that the market will remain limited to that
group. “The new prediction systems are only incidentally about ads . . . . [A]ny actor with an interest in
purchasing probabilistic information about our behavior and/or influencing future behavior” is a
potential customer. Id. at 96-97.
127. See id. at 95 (explaining that even slight increases in the accuracy of predicting behaviors can
yield substantial increases in profits); id. at 293 (describing how surveillance capitalists have begun to
progress from predicting user behavior to modifying user behavior).
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machine-learning algorithms that inform prediction products.128 Thus, the more data
about people a product can collect, the more lucrative that product may be for its
creator.
The privacy threats arising from an economic model dependent on collecting
ever-increasing amounts of personal information are significant. The model results
in an intrusive “hunt” for personal information, during which no facet of human
existence is off limits.129 Surveillance capitalists thus aim to collect data about us
when we browse the internet, watch television, play music, exercise, sleep, drive our
cars, heat our homes, and when we partake in virtually every other facet of society.
The decisions driven by companies’ use of this information may be innocuous
(Which cat photo should we show this person?), life-altering (Should we insure this
person?), or may pose systemic implications for democracy that we are still coming
to understand (Which candidate is this person likely to support?).
Additionally, the large amounts of information made available to surveillance
capitalists leave consumers vulnerable to the exploits of third parties. People can be
hacked, brigaded, doxed, bullied, humiliated, or impersonated on social media,
creating severe consequences for privacy, identity, and safety in the “real world.”
New technologies like facial recognition, biometric trackers (such as a FitBit),
drones, and advances in genetic testing have created thousands of new data points
that can similarly be used and exploited by companies, governments, and third
parties. And the volume and nature of the personal information that surveillance
capitalists store exacerbates the existing harm caused by data breaches—a problem
that is certain to further accelerate as we become increasingly dependent on the
internet for goods and services as a result of the COVID-19 crisis.
Like many states, Maine is still very much in the process of grasping the scope
of these privacy challenges and crafting appropriate legislative responses to them.
Thus far, Maine has enacted targeted reforms designed to combat specific problems
posed by the technological advances of this era. The state has acted to protect victims
of cyberharassment, to guard employees’ social media accounts from employers, to
protect the privacy of K-12 students from education technology providers, to regulate
the use of drones by law enforcement, and to establish consumer privacy protections
that apply to internet service providers (“ISPs”).
As in the two previous eras discussed above, Maine began this era of reform by
protecting the residents who are perhaps most vulnerable to online privacy
intrusions: victims of harassment. The ubiquity of smartphones and smartphone
cameras has led to two particularly disturbing forms of privacy intrusion that are
most commonly suffered by young women. The first occurs when a person sends a
victim an unauthorized and unsolicited sexual image. The victim in such situations
usually has no opportunity to avoid seeing the image: when they open the text
message, social media message, or email, the image is instantly before them.
128. See, e.g., id. at 95 (“Google’s machine intelligence capabilities feed on behavioral surplus, and
the more surplus they consume, the more accurate the prediction products that result.”).
129. See, e.g., id. at 93-94 (describing how surveillance capitalists once “found” personal
information by analyzing users’ online behavior, but how personal information is now “hunted
aggressively and produced largely through surveillance”); id. at 497 (describing surveillance capitalists’
goals of obtaining “total information” in order to produce “certainty and the promise of guaranteed
outcomes” for their prediction products).
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The legislature decided to address this form of lewd behavior by adding a new
offense to section 506 of the criminal code: “Harassment by telephone or electronic
communication device.”130 The new provision makes it a Class D crime to “send[]
an image or video of a sexual act . . . or of the actor’s or another person’s genitals”
with “intent to cause affront or alarm or for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
sexual desire,” to: (1) a minor under 14 years old; (2) a minor age 14 or 15, if the
offender is at least 5 years older than the minor; or (3) a person with a mental
disability that was reasonably apparent to the offender.131 The provision makes it a
Class E crime to send such an image or video without consent when the person
receiving the image or video has notified the actor that they do not consent to receive
the images or videos.132
The second intrusion occurs when a person posts nude images of another person
online without their consent. This is known as “revenge porn,” as it typically occurs
when a couple breaks up and one of the individuals posts the photos of their ex. 133
Images may be posted on social media, on a general porn site, or on sites specifically
dedicated to hosting revenge porn.134 The victims are almost always women.135
Testimony from the Director of Public Policy of the Maine Women’s Lobby before
the Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety succinctly summarizes the
problem:
One of the ways in which our laws have failed to protect victims of abuse is nonconsensual pornography or “revenge porn”. In some cases, intimate recordings or
photos may be taken consensually during a positive time in a relationship to be kept
private between intimate partners. But, sometimes, these recordings or images may
be taken non-consensually, either without the victim’s knowledge or under duress,
as part of a larger pattern of control and abuse. Later, these images are secretly
uploaded to a website created for this very purpose. . . . [T]his horrifying act is
made even worse when the pictures are accompanied by identifying information,
potentially including a name, a town, or even a physical address of the victim’s
home or place of employment. Some sites seek to profit from the posting of these
images, demanding thousands of dollars to have the image removed from each
website to which it was shared.136

130. Me. P.L. 2017, ch. 397 § 1.
131. Id.
132. Id. (codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 506(1)(A-2)).
133. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 17 (2014) (defining “revenge
porn” as “the posting of individuals’ nude photographs without their consent”). For additional materials
on revenge porn, see generally Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge
Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014); Zak Franklin, Comment, Justice for Revenge Porn
Victims: Legal Theories to Overcome Claims of Civil Immunity by Operators of Revenge Porn Websites,
102 CALIF. L. REV. 1303 (2014); Jenna K. Stokes, Note, The Indecent Internet: Resisting Unwarranted
Internet Exceptionalism in Combating Revenge Porn, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 929 (2014).
134. See, e.g., CITRON , supra note 133, at 45-46 (telling the story of a revenge porn victim whose
sexual images and contact information were shared on a site dedicated to revenge porn, on social media,
and on other websites).
135. Id. at 17 (stating that “most often, revenge porn features women” and citing a study showing
that 90 percent of revenge porn victims were female).
136. An Act to Prohibit the Unauthorized Dissemination of Certain Images: Hearing on L.D. 679
Before the Me. J. Comm. on Crim. Justice and Pub. Safety, 127th Legis. 23 (2015) (testimony of Danna
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The Committee heard more testimony regarding the impact revenge porn had on
Maine residents when it considered L.D. 679, “An Act to Prohibit the Unauthorized
Dissemination of Certain Private Images.”137 For example, Representative Grant
shared a story of a Maine woman whose partner filmed her “without her knowledge
having relations,” and then “threatened to put [the] images on the Internet unless she
submitted to his demands.”138 Representative Russell highlighted a similar story
from the Bangor Daily News which focused on a woman whose abusive ex created
a fake Facebook page with her identifying information, nude images, and a link to a
website with images of her performing sexual acts and encouraging people to contact
her for sex.139 Pine Tree Legal provided testimony showing that forty-four requests
for protection from abuse orders or harassment in Portland District Court involved
revenge porn in 2014.140
L.D. 679 passed through the legislature and went into effect on October 15,
2015, adding Maine to the list of approximately twenty-one other states that had
criminalized revenge porn. 141 With some exceptions, the Act made it a crime when
a person “knowingly disseminates, displays or publishes. . . with intent to harass,
torment, or threaten,” a photograph, videotape, film or digital recording of another
person in a state of nudity or engaged in a sexual act . . . when the person knows or
should have known that the depicted person” is age 18 or older, is identifiable, and
has not consented.142 The Act also gave victims the ability to obtain an protection
from abuse order in Maine district court.143
During the same legislative session in which Maine enacted its revenge porn
law, the state also established a key privacy protection for employees who use social
media platforms. A social media account holds a tremendous amount of personal
information. The account holder may make some of this information public, in
which case it can be viewed by anyone with internet access, including an employer
or prospective employer. But other information may be private. Social media users
Hayes, Director of Public Policy, Maine Women’s Lobby), available from Me. State Law & Leg.
Reference Library by requesting cf123-LD-0679.pdf.
137. L.D. 679 (127th Legis. 2015) (originally enacted by Me. P. L. 2015, ch. 339, § 1).
138. An Act to Prohibit the Unauthorized Dissemination of Certain Images: Hearing on L.D. 679
Before the Me. J. Comm. on Crim. Justice and Pub. Safety, 127th Legis. 23 (2015) (testimony of Rep.
Gay M. Grant).
139. Id. at 11-13 (testimony of Rep. Diane Russell); see also Regina Rooney, The Abuse Follows
Her Everywhere, and it’s Legal: One Woman’s Story of Revenge Porn, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Apr. 20,
2015), https://bangordailynews.com/2015/04/20/mainefocus/the-abuse-followed-her-everywhere-onewomans-story-of-revenge-porn/ [https://perma.cc/ DC5C-BZPA].
140. An Act to Prohibit the Unauthorized Dissemination of Certain Images: Hearing on L.D. 679
Before the Me. J. Comm. on Crim. Justice and Pub. Safety, 127th Legis. 23 (2015) (testimony of Lucia
Chomeau Hunt).
141. See END REVENGE PORN, Frequently Asked Questions, https://web.archive.org/web/201510
17065602/http://www.endrevengeporn.org/faqs (archived on Oct. 17, 2015) (listing 21 states that had
enacted revenge porn laws as of July 2015). Today, 46 states and the District of Columbia have passed
criminal laws regarding revenge porn. 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws,
CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/8A5MV477] (last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
142. Me. P.L. 2015, ch. 339, § 1.
143. Id. The legislature would soon amend the Act to ensure that images and identifying
information filed in revenge porn proceedings were kept under seal and to more fully integrate the Act
with the state’s abuse—and harassment—prevention laws. See Me. P.L. 2015, ch. 410.
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can adjust their privacy settings such that their content can be viewed only by their
“friends” or “followers” and platforms allow users to privately message each other.
In response to reports of employers and educational institutions requiring
employees or students to provide the employer or institution access to their social
media accounts, state lawmakers around the country began proposing legislation to
ban that practice.144 By the end of 2012, six states had enacted legislation protecting
employees or students from these intrusive demands. 145 Maine joined this trend in
2015 by prohibiting employers and prospective employers from requiring an
employee or applicant to disclose their social media passwords, access their accounts
in the employer’s presence, provide information about their accounts, disclose
contacts associated with their accounts, adjust the privacy settings of their accounts,
discipline employees for failing to comply with such requests, or decline to hire an
applicant for failing to comply with such requests.146
Maine also created privacy protections for students during this time by enacting
the “Student Information Privacy Act” (“SIPA”).147 The SIPA regulates “operators,”
which are entities that: (a) operate a website, online service, or application with
“actual knowledge” that the website, service or application is used for K-12 school
purposes “and was designed and marketed” for K-12 school purposes; and (b)
collect, maintain, or use student personal information in a digital or electronic
format.148 The SIPA subjects operators to several restrictions on how they can use
and disclose students’ data. Most notably, operators may not use student data to
engage in targeted advertising or to amass a profile about a student, sell student data,
or disclose student data to third parties (with some exceptions for service providers,
government agencies, and the like). 149 Operators must maintain reasonable security
procedures and practices.150 And, operators must delete student data within fortyfive days of receiving a request to delete from a school. 151
While the reforms of this era focused primarily on the privacy abuses attendant
to new technologies when they are in the hands of private actors, such technologies
may also be used and abused by governments. In 2015, Maine enacted a law
144. See Samuel A. Thumma, When You Cannot “Just Say No”: Protecting the Online Privacy of
Employees and Students, 69 S.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (noting the “reported incidents where employers
and educational institutions have demanded, and received” access to social media accounts); id. at 9-27
(reviewing different state legislative approaches to regulating employers’ and educational institutions’
access to their employees’ or students’ social media accounts).
145. See id. at 9-10 (“Six states enacted [social media access] legislation in 2012, with Maryland and
Illinois enacting laws in the employment context, Delaware and New Jersey enacting laws in the
educational context, and California and Michigan enacting laws in both the employment and educational
contexts.”). For a complete list of all bills proposed by state lawmakers pertaining to social media
account access, see Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/
employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx [https://perma.cc/2QHK-UULT] (last visited
Nov. 17, 2020) (compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures).
146. Me. P.L. 2015, ch. 343, § B-1. The law does contain a notable exception for investigations into
misconduct in which the employer “reasonably believes” social media information may be relevant. Id.
147. Me. P.L. 2015, ch. 256.
148. Id. (codified as amended at 20-A M.R.S.A. § 952(4)).
149. Id. (codified as amended at 20-A M.R.S.A. § 953).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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designed to curtail government abuses of one new technology that has enjoyed
widespread adoption during this era: drones. Drones are unmanned aerial vehicles
that may be equipped with surveillance technologies.152 They have numerous uses,
which may be innocuous (scenic photography),153 highly beneficial (facilitating
search and rescue operations),154 financially lucrative (automated delivery of
packages),155 dangerously abusive (stalking), 156 or downright dystopian (mass
surveillance of citizens).157
In the hands of law enforcement, drones could be used to “engage in constant,
blanket surveillance of people,” particularly given the “decreasing cost and
increasing capabilities” of drones over the last several years.158 Maine’s “Act to
Protect the Privacy of Citizens from Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” guards
against these potential abuses by creating a regulatory framework for law
enforcement’s use of drones.159 First, the Act requires prior approval from “the
152. See, e.g., Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches to
Domestic Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 8 (2014) (describing drones and their advantages
for use in surveillance); see also DJI, Mavic Air 2 Specifications, https://www.dji.com/mavic-air-2/
specs [https://perma.cc/63R3-NU7D] (last visited Nov. 17, 2020) (detailing the capabilities of a massmarketed drone, including its camera technology).
153. See Michael L. Smith, Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Drones: The Need for State
Legislation, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 423 (2015) (noting that private actors “use drones for hobbyist
purposes”).
154. See Department of Homeland Security, Snapshot: First Responders Assess Drones for Search
and Rescue Missions, (Apr. 2, 2020) https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2020/04/02/
snapshot-first-responders-assess-drones-search-and-rescue-missions [https://perma.cc/7PEN-V95B]
(describing the various ways in which first responders can use drones and stating that “[s]mall drones
offer tremendous potential for emergency response missions”).
155. See, e.g., Amazon Unveils Futuristic Plan: Delivery by Drone, CBS NEWS (Dec. 1, 2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-unveils-futuristic-plan-delivery-by-drone/ [https://perma.cc/
8623-QWTJ] (announcing Amazon’s plans to use drones to deliver merchandise); Jeff Wilke, A Drone
Program Taking Flight, AMAZON (June 5, 2019), https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/transportation/
a-drone-program-taking-flight [https://perma.cc/3TED-JW2J] (unveiling an Amazon Prime air drone
“that can fly up to 15 miles and deliver packages under five pounds to customers in less than 30
minutes”). See generally Steve Calandrillo et al., Deadly Drones? Why FAA Regulations Miss the Mark
on Drone Safety, 23 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 182 (2020) (critiquing the Federal Aviation Administration’s
approach to regulating drones).
156. See Petition from Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) to the Fed. Aviation Admin. 3
(Feb. 24, 2012), https://epic.org/apa/lawsuit/EPIC-FAA-Drone-Petition-March-8-2012.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P86C-HGGP] (raising the possibility that “[c]riminals and other may use drones for purposes
of stalking and harassment”).
157. See, e.g., Mark Hanrahan, Coronavirus: China Deploys Drones with Cameras, Loudhailers to
Chastise People for Unsafe Behavior, ABC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2020, 9:46 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/
International/coronavirus-china-deploys-drones-cameras-loudhailers-chastise-people/story?id=
68746989 [https://perma.cc/56YC-3VHT] (describing how China has used drones to enforce social
distancing rules during the coronavirus pandemic).
158. Smith, supra note 153, at 440-41; see also Farber, supra note 152, at 2 (“State and local police
departments are eager to equip themselves with drones because they are cheaper and more efficient than
helicopters and other types of manned aircraft.”).
159. Me. P.L. 2015, ch. 307 (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501). In the legislative findings section of
the Act, the legislature noted several potential benefits to drones, but concluded that “the technology
also presents a potential threat to the privacy of citizens of this State if used by law enforcement in the
conduct of criminal investigations without appropriate guidelines and supervision.” Id. (codified at 25
M.R.S.A. § 4501(1)).
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governing body of the governmental unit overseeing the law enforcement agency”
before the agency can acquire a drone.160 Second, the Act limits how drones may be
used. Most significantly, law enforcement agencies must obtain a warrant to use a
drone, unless the drone’s use would be permitted by an exception to the warrant
requirement under the U.S. Constitution or the Constitution of Maine. 161 They are
prohibited from using weaponized drones and from using drones to surveil peaceful
protests, but they may use drones for non-investigatory purposes, such as search and
rescue operations or assessing damage caused by natural disasters. 162 Third, the Act
requires the Trustees of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy to develop minimum
standards governing the use of drones by law enforcement agencies. The standards
must include training requirements; requirements to obtain prior approval from
higher-ups prior to use; restrictions on the use of intrusive technologies such as highpowered zoom lenses, video analytics, thermal imaging, and facial recognition;
procedures to minimize intrusions on third parties who are not the subject of an
investigation; and more.163 Finally, the Act contains a transparency requirement
pursuant to which the Commissioner of Public Safety must compile summaries of
law enforcement agencies’ drone use and warrant requests for deploying drones. 164
Most recently, Maine became the first (and thus far the only) state in the nation
to regulate ISPs’ use of their customers’ personal information. Maine passed “An
Act to Protect the Privacy of Online Customer Information” shortly after the Trump
Administration nixed the Federal Communication Commission’s attempt to regulate
the same.165 The Act requires ISPs to obtain consumers’ consent before using,
disclosing, or selling their personal information; to take reasonable security measures
to protect consumers’ personal information; and to provide consumers notice of their
rights and the ISPs’ obligations under the Act. 166
160. Id. (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(3)).
161. Id. (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(4)(B)).
162. Id. (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(4)(C)-(F)).
163. Id. (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(5)). The Act also contains an exception whereby lay
enforcement agencies can use drones without adopting these standards in emergency situations, with
approval from the agency’s chief or the Governor. See id. (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(4)(G)).
164. Id. (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(6)). For a comparative evaluation of how other states have
regulated law enforcement’s use of drones, see Smith, supra note 153, at 427-39 (comparing legislation
from Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, and Wisconsin).
165. Me. P.L. 2019, ch. 216; see also Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other
Telecommunications Services, 31 FCC Rec. 13911 (2017); David Shepardson, Trump Signs Repeal of
U.S. Broadband Privacy Rules, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2017, 7:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-internet-trump/trump-signs-repeal-of-u-s-broadband-privacy-rules-idUSKBN1752PR [https://
perma.cc/5BF7-G4P4].
166. Me. P.L. 2019, ch. 216. There is good reason for targeting ISPs for additional regulation when
it comes to consumer privacy protections. ISPs have access to information regarding every website a
user visits and have at times used this access “in privacy-invasive ways, like creating extensive
portfolios of their users’ online activity and injecting ‘super cookies’ that allow third parties to track
individual customers.” Arianna Demas, Maine’s ISP Privacy Law Does Not Violate the First
Amendment, Much as ISPs Would Like for It To, ACLU (May 29, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/
privacy-technology/maines-isp-privacy-law-does-not-violate-the-first-amendment-much-as-isps-wouldlike-for-it-to/ [https://perma.cc/BF76-5FYT]. And, as the bill’s sponsor put it, interacting with an ISP is
“not optional” like visiting a particular website or using a particular software may be; the internet is
increasingly a necessity. Steve Mistler, Maine Lawmakers Send One Of The Country's Toughest
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The state’s early-mover status drew the ire of industry groups, who promptly
filed suit in federal district court in Bangor. The complaint in ACA Connects v. Frey
argues that the Maine law violates the First Amendment guarantee of free speech by,
inter alia, requiring ISPs to obtain consent before using customers’ personal
information.167 The complaint also argues that the statute’s “amorphous, broad, and
open-ended restrictions will . . . [unconstitutionally] chill ISPs’ protected First
Amendment speech.”168 The case has received national attention, including an
amicus brief in support of the Act jointly filed by the ACLU, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, and the Center for Democracy and Technology. 169 As of this writing,
the district court has denied the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings—
rejecting their First Amendment arguments at that stage of the proceedings—and the
matter is continuing through the discovery stage of litigation.170
D. Summary of Maine Privacy Law
Over the last five decades, Maine has developed a body of privacy law designed
to protect against threats to individual privacy that have evolved and expanded with
technological advances. These protections include many foundational privacy laws
that can be found in most jurisdictions across the country—laws governing
wiretapping, credit reporting, unauthorized computer access, stalking and
harassment, private investigators, polygraphs, and data breaches are some examples.
In more recent years, Maine has risen to the challenge of protecting its residents’
privacy by passing modern privacy laws aimed at emerging privacy risks. Such laws
include the state’s regulation of ISPs, education technology providers, employers’
access to social media accounts, and law enforcement’s use of drones.
Despite Maine’s recent efforts to respond to the new privacy challenges posed
by advances in big data, social media, machine learning, and other new technologies,
there is much work to be done. Maine’s new privacy laws are largely intended to
protect specific vulnerable segments of the population, regulate specific actors, or
guard against intrusions posed by specific new technologies. This targeted approach
to privacy reform cannot account for the myriad privacy threats that Maine residents
face today. It does not safeguard Mainers’ privacy from the surveillance capitalist
economic model discussed above and it leaves residents vulnerable to certain new
technologies that carry potential for serious privacy intrusions.
To be sure, this critique could be repeated for nearly every state in the nation as
well as the federal government. But Maine can and should do better. In Part III of
this Article, I propose several reforms that would fill these gaps and make Maine a
national leader in protecting its residents’ privacy.

Internet Privacy Proposals To The Governor’s Desk, ME. PUB. RADIO (May 3, 2019), https://www.
mainepublic.org/post/maine-lawmakers-send-one-countrys-toughest-internet-privacy-proposalsgovernor-s-desk [https://perma.cc/MTS5-JQG3] (quoting Democratic state Senator Shenna Bellows).
167. See Complaint at 2, ACA Connects v. Frey, No. 1:20-cv-00055 (D. Me. Feb. 14, 2020).
168. Id. at 4. The complaint also alleges that federal law preempts the Act. Id.
169. See ACLU et. al as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant, ACA Connects v. Frey, 471 F. Supp.
3d 318 (D. Me. July 7, 2020).
170. See ACA Connects, 471 F. Supp. 3d at 322, 328. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ claim
that federal law preempts the Act. Id. at 326.
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III. MODERNIZING MAINE PRIVACY LAW
In Part III of this Article, I propose two categories of privacy reforms. First,
Maine should enact a general consumer privacy statute to give residents control over
how companies collect, use, and share their personal information and to protect
residents from companies that use their personal information in problematic ways.
Section II(A) begins by providing overviews of two possible models for a Maine
consumer privacy law—the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) and the
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). Drawing from
these privacy regimes, I then advance several recommendations to shape a consumer
privacy law for Maine. Second, Maine should supplement the general consumer
privacy law with new laws aimed at emerging privacy threats that require closer
regulation. In Section II(B), I identify five areas in which targeted legislation would
be desirable: facial recognition technology; biometric information; smart-home
devices; data brokers; and the Maine Information and Analysis Center. I then
suggest desirable features of potential legislation for each of these issues.
A. Consumer Privacy Protections
Enacting a general consumer privacy law that gives consumers rights to their
personal information and imposes privacy obligations on businesses is perhaps the
most significant step Maine can take toward protecting its residents’ privacy. Such
a law should include the creation of a state agency dedicated to protecting residents’
privacy and it should vest that agency with rulemaking authority to address new
privacy threats as they emerge and evolve.
There are two existing models on which Maine could pattern a consumer privacy
law: the GDPR and the CCPA. Both governing models vest consumers with
individual rights to their personal information and impose affirmative obligations on
businesses to effectuate those rights and safeguard consumer personal information.
However, the scope of individual rights and business obligations created by the two
laws differ in important respects and the laws’ enforcement mechanisms vary as well.
Both privacy regimes are worth examining in fashioning a consumer privacy law for
Maine.
1. Potential Templates for a Maine Consumer Privacy Model: The GDPR
The GDPR is regarded as the world’s most stringent data privacy regime. The
2016 law regulates how “controllers” (a person that determines the “purposes and
means of the processing of personal data”) and “processors” (a person who processes
personal data on behalf of a controller) collect, use, and share the “personal data”
(“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”) of “data
subjects” (an “identifiable natural person”).171 A complete analysis of the GDPR is
beyond the scope of this Article, but providing a basic understanding of data
subjects’ rights, the obligations imposed on controllers and processors, and the law’s
171. Commission Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 27,
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU) [hereinafter GDPR] (“Definitions”).
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enforcement mechanisms is important to framing a Maine consumer privacy law.
a. Data Subjects’ Individual Rights
Right of Access: Data subjects have the right to access their personal data. The
right of access allows the data subject to obtain from a controller who is processing
their personal data the purposes of the processing; the types of personal data being
processed; the persons to whom personal data may be disclosed; the duration the
controller will store the subject’s personal information; and more. 172 Data subjects
also have the right to know whether the processing of their personal data includes
the use of automated decision-making or the use of “profiling,” and to obtain certain
information about the nature and purpose of such processing. 173
Right to Data Portability: The right to data portability supplements the right of
access to ensure that data subjects can receive a copy of their personal data in a
“structured, commonly used and machine-readable format” that allows the subject to
transfer the data to another controller (i.e., a competitor) without hinderance. 174
Right to Rectification: Data subjects have the right to rectify—or correct—
inaccurate or incomplete personal information held by a controller. 175
Right to Erasure: The right to erasure, also known as the right to be forgotten,
gives data subjects the right to require controllers to erase their personal data.176 This
right is not absolute. There are several exceptions that would allow a controller to
decline to erase a data subject’s personal data.177
Right to Restriction of Processing: There may be situations in which a data
subject contests the controller’s processing of their personal data but does not want
the controller to erase the contested data. In that and similar situations, the GDPR
gives data subjects the right to instruct a controller to restrict processing their
personal data. This right requires the controller to stop processing the subject’s
personal data, but to continuing storing that data instead of erasing it. 178
Right to Object: Data subjects have the right to object to the processing of their
personal information.179 While this right has some exceptions, a controller must
always honor a data subject’s objection to the use of their personal data for direct
marketing purposes, creating an effective right to “opt-out” from the use of personal
data for such purposes.180
172. See Id. art. 15 (“Right of access by the data subject”).
173. Id. “Profiling” means “any form of automated processing . . . consisting of the use of personal
data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict
aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal
preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements.” Id. art. 4 (“Definitions”).
174. Id. art. 20 (“Right to data portability”).
175. Id. art. 16 (“Right to rectification”).
176. Id. art. 17 (“Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)”).
177. For example, a controller may decline to erase personal data in some situations where there is
an “overriding legitimate ground[]” for the processing, where the processing is necessary “for exercising
the right of freedom and expression and information,” and for “reasons of public interest in the area of
public health.” Id. art. 17.
178. Id. art. 18 (“Right to restriction of processing”).
179. Id. art. 21 (“Right to object”).
180. Id. (creating an exception whereby the controller can continue processing personal data if they
demonstrate “compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and
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Automated Processing Rights: Data subjects have the right “not to be subject to
a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which
produces legal [or similarly significant] effects concerning him or her.” 181 As with
other GDPR rights, data subjects’ automated processing rights are qualified.
Controllers and processors may engage in automated decision-making if it is
necessary to the performance of a contract with the data subject or if they obtain the
data subject’s “explicit consent.”182 However, even where these exceptions apply,
the controller must take steps to protect the data subject’s rights and freedoms,
including the right to obtain “human intervention” in the automated decision-making
process, and the right for the data subject to contest the automated decision.183
Moreover, automated decisions may not be based on sensitive characteristics such as
race, ethnicity, political opinion, religion, and sexual orientation. 184
b. Controllers’ and Processors’ Privacy Obligations
The obligations the GDPR imposes on controllers and processors are designed
to effectuate these individual rights. These obligations are extensive and nuanced;
only a brief overview is necessary to frame the conversation for proposing a Maine
consumer privacy law.
First, controllers must have a legal basis for processing a data subject’s personal
information. The GDPR enumerates six legal bases for processing, the most
commonly invoked of which are processing by consent or processing pursuant to a
contract with the data subject.185 Because most websites use consent as the legal
basis for processing personal data obtained through cookies and similar web-tracking
tools, companies that are subject to the GDPR (and many who are not) have added
“cookie banners” to their websites, which ask users to consent to the collection of
personal information before using the website. 186
Second, the GDPR imposes restrictions on how controllers and processors can
collect and process data.187 Many people have personal data under the control of
dozens, if not hundreds, of controllers. Managing how controllers use that data can
be a full-time job in and of itself. The GDPR’s collection and processing restrictions
freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims”); id. (“Where
the data subject objects to processing for direct marketing purposes, the personal data shall no longer be
processed for such purposes.”).
181. Id. art. 22.
182. Id. The right also does not apply if the decision-making is “authorised by Union or Member
State law to which the controller is subject and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the
data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests.” Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. There are narrow exceptions that allow automated decision-making on these bases in some
situations where the controller has obtained consent or there is a substantial public interest for the
processing. See id. (referencing the sensitive characteristics and the exceptions contained in GDPR art.
9, “Processing of special categories of personal data”).
185. See id. art. 6.
186. See generally Martin Degeling et al., We Value Your Privacy … Now Take Some Cookies:
Measuring the GDPR’s Impact on Web Privacy, NETWORK & DISTRIBUTED SYS. SEC. (NDSS) SYMP.
2019 (conducting an examination of 6,579 of the most popular websites in the EU’s 28 member states
and concluding that by February 2019 62.1% of the websites had added cookie banners).
187. See GDPR, supra note 171, art. 5 (“Principles relating to processing of personal data”).
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are designed to shift some of the burden onto controllers for ensuring that personal
data is used in accordance with the data subject’s expectations. The restrictions
include obligations to minimize the amount of personal data a controller or processor
uses (“data minimization”), to collect personal data only for specified purposes and
to use the data only for those purposes (“purpose limitation”), and to store personal
data in an identifiable format for no longer than is necessary for the specified
Controllers must
purpose(s) of the processing (“storage limitation”). 188
operationalize these restrictions by implementing “appropriate technical and
organizational measures.”189
Third, controllers have several notification obligations designed to facilitate data
subjects’ exercise of their rights. 190 This includes disclosing to the data subject, at
the time when personal data is collected, the identity of the controller, the purposes
of the processing and the legal basis of the processing, third parties with whom the
data may be shared, details about data subjects’ rights, any use of automated
decision-making, and more.191 Additionally, upon receipt of a request to delete or to
rectify, controllers must notify third parties with whom they have shared the data
subject’s personal data, such that the data subject does not need to separately submit
a request to each person with whom the controller shares their personal data. 192
Fourth, the GDPR imposes heightened requirements for processing certain
sensitive types of personal data. This includes processing children’s personal data 193;
processing personal data pertaining to criminal convictions and offenses; 194
processing personal data revealing sensitive demographic information such as race,
religion, political opinion, or sexual orientation; 195 and processing genetic data or
biometric data.196
c. Enforcement
The final aspect of the GDPR that is important to understand in considering a
framework for a Maine consumer privacy law is the GDPR’s approach to
enforcement. The GDPR requires EU member states to vest regulatory authority

188. Id.
189. Id. art. 25 (“Data protection by design and by default”).
190. See id. art. 12 (“Transparent information, communication and modalities for the exercise of the
rights of the data subject”).
191. See id. art. 13 (“Information to be provided where personal data are collected from the data
subject”); Id. art. 14 (“Information to be provided where personal data have not been obtained from the
data subject”).
192. See id. art. 19 (“Notification obligation regarding rectification or erasure of personal data or
restriction of processing”).
193. See id. art. 8 (“Conditions applicable to child's consent in relation to information society
services”) (requiring parental consent for processing personal information of children under age 16).
194. Id. art. 10 (“Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences”)
(allowing processing of such information only under government control or supervision, unless
otherwise authorized by a Union or Member-State law that contains appropriate safeguards for the rights
and freedoms of data subjects).
195. Id. art. 9 (“Processing of special categories of personal data”) (prohibiting the processing of
such data and listing exceptions to the prohibition).
196. See id. (listing biometric information and genetic information among the list of special
categories of personal data).
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over the GDPR in an independent agency, called a “supervisory authority.” 197 These
agencies have numerous responsibilities and powers relating to the implementation
and interpretation of the GDPR, enforcement, investigations, and more. 198 The
agencies are required to receive and process complaints filed by data subjects against
controllers or processors and have authority to impose administrative fines in
substantial amounts.199 Depending on the circumstances, a supervisory authority
may impose fines of up to €20,000,000 or 4% of a company’s annual global
revenues.200
The GDPR also includes a private right of action for data subjects who believe
their GDPR rights have been violated. Data subjects have the right to an “effective
judicial remedy” against a controller or processor that the data subject believes
infringed their GDPR rights.201 This right includes the ability to obtain compensation
for damages from the controller or processor.202 Data subjects also have the right to
an effective judicial remedy against supervisory authorities that make a decision
adverse to the data subject or fail to process the data subject’s complaint. 203
2. Potential Templates for a Maine Consumer Privacy Model: The CCPA
In 2018, California became the first state in the U.S. to enact a comprehensive
consumer privacy law.204 The state adopted the CCPA as an eleventh-hour
compromise with Californians for Consumer Privacy, a nonprofit group that had
developed a consumer privacy ballot initiative that Californians were expected to
pass in the 2018 election cycle.205 The group agreed to pull the initiative in exchange
for the legislature enacting the CCPA.206
The CCPA regulates “businesses,” a term defined to encompass companies that:
(a) do business in California; and (b) have annual revenues exceeding $25 million,
collect personal information from more than 50,000 California residents; or (c)
derive 50% or more of their revenues from selling California residents’ personal
197. Id. art. 51 (“Supervisory authority”).
198. Id. arts. 57-58 (“Tasks” and “Powers,” respectively).
199. Id. arts. 77, 83 (“Right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority” and “General
conditions for imposing administrative fines,” respectively).
200. Id. art. 83(5).
201. Id. art. 79 (“Right to an effective judicial remedy against a controller or processor”).
202. Id. art. 82 (“Right to compensation and liability”).
203. Id. art. 78 (“Right to an effective judicial remedy against a supervisory authority”).
204. As I discuss later in this Section, in the 2020 election cycle California voters approved a ballot
initiative called the California Privacy Rights Act (“CPRA”). That law significantly expands upon the
CCPA’s privacy protections such that California’s privacy regime will look much like the GDPR when
the core components of the CPRA go into effect in 2023. However, in this Section, I focus on the
CCPA as originally enacted to provide Maine legislators and reformers with a contrast between two
types of privacy regimes: the GDPR and the (original) CCPA.
205. See Stuart L. Pardau, The California Consumer Privacy Act: Towards a European-Style
Privacy Regime in the United States?, 23 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 68, 89-91 (2018) (describing the
circumstances surrounding Californians for Consumer Privacy’s ballot initiative and the legislature’s
adoption of the CCPA); The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2017 Cal. A.B. 375 (West
2017), (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100-198 (West 2018)); Yes on 24,
CALIFORNIANS FOR CONSUMER PRIV., http://www.caprivacy.org [https://perma.cc/YE85-4HTJ] (last
visited Apr. 11, 2021).
206. Pardau, supra note 205, at 90-91.
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information.207 The Act gives California residents—called “consumers”—certain
rights to their “personal information,” which is defined broadly to encompass any
information reasonably capable of being associated with a consumer. 208
The CCPA is sometimes called “California’s GDPR,” but the laws contain many
important differences.209 The rights created by the CCPA are more limited than those
created by the GDPR, and the obligations imposed on covered businesses are
concomitantly more limited as well. The CCPA also did not create a dedicated
consumer privacy agency to implement and enforce the law. And, the private right
of action provided by the CCPA is far more limited than the GDPR’s.
Consumers have three main rights under the CCPA: the right to know, the right
to delete, and the right to opt-out. The right to know is a transparency measure. It
gives consumers the right to obtain from a business information about the personal
information it has collected about the consumer. 210 This information includes the
types of sources from which the business collects personal information, the purposes
for which the company collects and sells personal information, the types of persons
with whom the business shares personal information, and the categories and specific
pieces of personal information collected.211 The right to delete allows consumers to
instruct businesses to delete their personal information, but the right contains many
exceptions that allow businesses to decline a request to delete.212 Lastly, the right to
opt-out allows consumers to opt-out from the sale of their personal information.213
207. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1) (West 2018) (defining “Business”). “Businesses” under the
CCPA are comparable to “controllers” under the GDPR. See GDPR, supra note 171, art 4. The CCPA
also regulates service providers, which are comparable to “processors” under the GDPR. See §
1798.140(v) (defining “Service provider”); see also GDPR, supra note 171, art. 4.
208. See § 1798.140(g) (defining “consumer”); id. § 1798.140(o) (defining “personal information”
as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or
could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household,” and listing
several categories of information that may be personal information under the Act).
209. See, GDPR & CCPA: Opt-ins, Consumer Control, and the Impact of Competition and
Innovation: Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 12 (2019) [hereinafter
Richardson Testimony] (testimony of Michelle Richardson of the Center for Democracy & Technology)
(“While the CCPA is often referred to as a ‘Californian GDPR,’ this is inaccurate.”); Luke Irwin,
California's 'GDPR-Like' Privacy Law Passes: What You Need to Know, IT GOVERNANCE USA BLOG
(July 16, 2018), https://www.itgovernanceusa.com/blog/californias-gdpr-like-privacy-law-passes-whatyou-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/66CM-L6F8] (referring to the CCPA as being similar to the
GDPR); Richi Jennings, CCPA, California's GDPR, Confuses and Confounds, TECHBEACON,
https://techbeacon.com/security/ccpa-californias-gdpr-confuses-confounds [https://perma.cc/P8YGYZZE] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (same); Andy Patrizio, While No One Was Looking, California
Passed its Own GDPR, NETWORK WORLD (July 5, 2018), https://www.networkworld.com/article/
3286611/while-no-one-was-looking-california-passed-its-own-gdpr.html [https://perma.cc/6BBWZRXY] (same).
210. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.110 (West 2020) (giving consumers the right to request
information about their personal information from a business and obligating businesses to disclose such
information).
211. See id. § 1798.110(a) (listing the types of information a consumer may request from a
business).
212. See id. § 1798.105 (creating the right to delete and stating that a business need not comply with
a request to delete in several circumstances, such as when the personal information is necessary to
complete a transaction, detect a security incident, exercise free speech, comply with a legal obligation,
or when the personal information is used for certain internal purposes).
213. See id. § 1798.120 (establishing the right to opt-out).
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The obligations imposed on businesses mirror these rights. Businesses must
provide a notice, at or before the point of collecting personal information, that
discloses what personal information the business collects, the purposes for which the
business uses the information, a link allowing consumers to opt-out from the sale of
their personal information, and a link to the business’s privacy policy. 214 A
business’s privacy policy must in turn contain an explanation of how consumers can
submit requests to exercise their CCPA rights. 215 Businesses must also establish
processes to receive and process consumers’ requests to exercise their rights,
including maintaining a “Do Not Sell My Information” link on their websites that
allows consumers to opt-out of the sale of their personal information. 216
These rights and obligations are narrower than those imposed by the GDPR.
The right to know, delete, and opt-out parallel the GDPR’s rights of access, erasure,
and objection to direct marketing, but the CCPA does not contain a right to
rectification, rights regarding automated decision-making or profiling, or rights
regarding sensitive personal information (except children’s information 217). The
CCPA also does not require businesses to establish a legal basis, such as consent, for
processing personal information; businesses only need to provide notice—not obtain
consent—before collecting information. Given the lack of a consent requirement,
there is no right to object to processing under the CCPA.218 Finally, the CCPA does
not contain parallels to the GDPR’s data minimization requirement or its data storage
limitations. These omissions have led privacy advocates to criticize the law for
placing too heavy a burden on consumers in policing how businesses use their
personal information.219
The CCPA and the GDPR differ significantly when it comes to enforcement, as
well. Unlike the GDPR, the CCPA did not create an independent agency for
implementing and enforcing the law. The law instead vested that authority in the
California Attorney General,220 who may impose civil penalties up to $2,500 per
214. See id. § 1798.100 (establishing the notice requirement); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.305(b)
(2020) (listing the notice’s required content).
215. See CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1798.130(a)(5) (listing content that is required to be included in a
business’s privacy policy, including a “description of a consumer’s rights pursuant to [the CCPA] and
two or more designated methods for submitting requests”).
216. See id § 1798.130(a)(1)-(2) (requiring businesses to establish processes for consumers to
submit requests for information and requiring businesses to respond to such requests within specified
time limits); id. § 1798.135 (requiring businesses to maintain a “Do Not Sell My Personal Information”
link that brings consumers to a web page where they can opt-out from the sale of their personal
information).
217. The CCPA prohibits businesses from knowingly selling the personal information of children
under 16 years-old unless the business obtains consent from: (a) the child’s parent if the child is less
than 13; or (b) the child if the child is 13, 14, or 15 years-old. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(c) (West
2020).
218. As noted directly above, the CCPA’s right to opt-out does parallel the GDPR’s right to object,
but only to the extent the GDPR right applies to direct marketing of personal data.
219. See, e.g., Richardson Testimony, supra note 209, at 12-13 (criticizing the CCPA as being
“largely focused on transparency” rather than on limiting data collection and use). Indeed, Richardson
is critical of both regulatory regimes for the burdens they place on consumers. Id. at 13-15. Relying on
a notice or consent requirement “burdens individuals with navigating every notice, data policy, and
setting, trying to make informed choices that align with their personal privacy interests.” Id. at 14.
220. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185(a) (West 2020) (requiring the Attorney General to adopt
regulations).
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unintentional violation and $7,500 per intentional violation. 221 And, the CCPA
provides only a limited private right of action to consumers. Consumers may only
bring suit under the CCPA when a business’s lax security practices lead to a data
breach that causes the consumer harm. 222 The law establishes a statutory damages
range of $100 - $750 per consumer, per incident, or actual damages, whichever is
greater.223 The CCPA does not give consumers a private right of action when a
business violates the right to know, right to delete, or right to opt-out.
Many of the material differences between the CCPA and the GDPR may be short
lived. In November 2020, Californians approved Prop. 24, the California Privacy
Rights Act (“CPRA”), which amended the CCPA to bring consumers’ rights and
businesses’ obligations in line with the GDPR’s treatment of data subjects and
controllers.224 The CPRA also created a dedicated state agency to protect consumer
privacy, the California Privacy Protection Agency. 225 While the provisions of the
CPRA creating the new agency went into effect immediately, the new consumer
rights are not effective until January 1, 2023.226
3. Maine Consumer Privacy Legislation
Maine’s legislature has already recognized the importance of the privacy
interests protected by the GDPR and the CCPA and has granted some of the rights
provided by those laws. However, Maine has done so only for limited classes of
people and in limited circumstances. The “Student Information Privacy Act”
(“SIPA”), discussed above, provides a prime example. By enacting the SIPA, the
legislature acknowledged the privacy risks created when companies use personal
data for marketing purposes and accordingly prevented covered businesses from
using students’ data for such purposes. 227 Like the GDPR, the SIPA contains
protections against profiling; a recognition that amassing personal data to gain
insights into a person’s preferences and behaviors can create a significant violation
of privacy.228 The SIPA prohibits the sale of student data and limits when such data
can be disclosed to third parties, protecting similar privacy interests as the GDPR’s

221. Id. § 1798.155(b).
222. Id. § 1798.150(a)(1) (authorizing a civil action for certain security breaches).
223. Id. § 1798.150(A) (creating the damages limitation).
224. See Cal. Sec’y of State, Proposition 24 Amends Consumer Privacy Laws, https://
electionresults.sos.ca.gov/returns/maps/ballot-measures/prop/24 [https://perma.cc/G7ZD-GBEF] (last
visited Apr. 27, 2021) (showing that Proposition 24 passed by a 56.2% – 43.8% margin); California
Proposition 24, Consumer Personal Information Law and Agency Initiative (2020), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_24,_Consumer_Personal_Information_Law_and_Agency
_Initiative_(2020) [https://perma.cc/HWR3-J7WC] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (showing that
Proposition 24 passed by a 56.2% to 43.8% margin); Cal. Sec’y of State, Proposition 24, §§ 5-11,
https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2020/general/pdf/topl-prop24.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV68-NZT2] (last visited
Apr. 11, 2021) (establishing consumer rights).
225. Cal. Sec’y of State, Proposition 24, § 24, https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2020/general/pdf/toplprop24.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV68-NZT2] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (establishing the California
Privacy Protection Agency).
226. Id. § 31 (establishing the effective dates for various provisions of the CPRA).
227. See 20-A M.R.S.A. §§ 951-53 (Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.).
228. Id. § 953(1)(B).
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right to object and the CCPA’s right to opt-out.229 Finally, the SIPA requires covered
businesses to implement reasonable security controls and requires businesses to
delete students’ data upon request.230 The GDPR and the CCPA both impose similar
obligations.231
Maine’s groundbreaking legislation protecting the privacy of ISP customers
likewise guards many of the same privacy interests as the GDPR and the CCPA. In
enacting the ISP legislation, the legislature took the position that threats to privacy
come not only from the exploitation of personal information like names, dates of
birth, credit cards, and social security numbers, but also from technical information
like device identifiers, application usage history, and IP addresses that can be used
to track an individual’s online behavior. 232 The legislation’s broad definition of
“customer personal information” encompasses these identifiers just as do the
CCPA’s and the GDPR’s respective definitions of “personal information” and
“personal data.”233 The legislation also contains notice and consent requirements
and imposes cybersecurity obligations, all of which are similar to obligations found
in either the GDPR or the CCPA.234
These laws, in sum, constitute a legislative recognition that certain classes of
Mainers—K-12 students and ISP customers—have a privacy interest in controlling
how their personal information is collected, used, shared, and sold. It is time for the
legislature to recognize that all Maine residents hold these privacy interests and that
a wide variety of businesses put these interests at risk. Maine should enact a general
consumer privacy law.
The details of a Maine consumer privacy law would necessarily be the product
of much legislative debate, input from privacy advocates and industry, and
compromise. Here, I limit my recommendations to structural features of the law that
I deem particularly desirable or important for the state. Lawmakers and reformers
should view these recommendations as a starting point for the conversation around
enacting a Maine consumer privacy law. I leave choices such as what specific rights
to give consumers, whether to require businesses to establish a lawful basis before
collecting personal information, and whether the law should apply to all persons that
collect personal information (like the GDPR) or to a subset of businesses based on
revenue or data-collection thresholds (like the CCPA) up to the legislative process.
Rulemaking Authority: A Maine consumer privacy law should give a state
agency the power to promulgate regulations interpreting the law. Maine’s recent
229. Id. § 953(1)(C)-(D); see also id. § 953(3) (listing exceptions to SIPA’s disclosure restrictions).
230. Id. § 953(2)(B).
231. See GDPR, supra note 171, art. 17 (“Right to Erasure (‘Right to be Forgotten’)”); id. art. 32
(“Security of Processing”) (requiring processors and controllers to implement “appropriate technical and
organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk” posed by a breach of the
personal data processed by the person); CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (West 2020) (establishing the right
to delete); CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (West 2020) (incentivizing strong security practices by creating a
private right of action when a consumer’s “nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information” is
breached as a result of the business’s “violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable
security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information”).
232. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 9301(1)(C) (Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.).
233. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2021 Reg. Sess.)
(defining “personal information”); GDPR, supra note 171, art. 4(1) (defining “personal data”).
234. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 9301(3), (6) (Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.).
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history of privacy reform illustrates why vesting such authority in a state agency is
necessary. The history shows a legislature grappling with a near-impossible task:
keeping up with advances in technology that move faster than a deliberative body
can reasonably be expected to move. 235 Giving a state agency authority to clarify
ambiguities in the law, to provide guidance on implementing the law, and to
promulgate regulations applying the law to new technologies would go a long way
toward mitigating the challenges inherent to legislating privacy protections. 236
The most desirable option for allocating regulatory authority over consumer
privacy would be to create a new agency dedicated to the task, much like EU
member-states and California now have. A dedicated consumer privacy agency
would be more capable of developing expertise in the area, working with industry,
and enforcing the law than would an agency with numerous competing
responsibilities. If, however, establishing a new state agency is politically untenable,
then the legislature could grant regulatory and enforcement authority to the Office of
the Maine Attorney General, given its relevant experience with enforcement and
rulemaking for Maine’s consumer protection laws and the state’s data breach law.237
Private Right of Action: The law should include a private right of action rather
than rely solely on agency actions for enforcement. A private right of action would
allow consumers to vindicate their own privacy rights rather than be dependent on
an agency to act. Further, enforcement actions can be expensive and timeconsuming, particularly when an action is brought against a large tech company that
can afford an army of lawyers. In a state with limited resources, like Maine, a private
right of action can save costs by shifting some of the enforcement burden to private
sector attorneys and advocacy groups.
A private right of action would likely draw pushback from industry and industry
allies in the legislature.238 New privacy laws can be difficult for companies to
235. Cf. Anne T. McKenna, Pass Parallel Privacy Standards or Privacy Perishes, 65 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1041, 1085 (2013) (“[O]ne consistent failing in privacy legislation has been that legislation is
drafted in technology-specific terms or technology-specific application; given the pace of advancements
in technology, this has resulted in outdated and inapplicable portions of law.”); Michael T. Rustad &
Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 374-75 (2019)
(describing the “legal lag” that occurs “when laws fall behind disruptive societal developments, such as
rapid technological change”).
236. Cf. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., FEDERAL BASELINE PRIVACY LEGISLATION DISCUSSION
DRAFT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2018-12-12-CDT-PrivacyDiscussion-Draft-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3NH-CWA3] (proposing federal privacy legislation that
gives the Federal Trade Commission rulemaking authority).
237. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 (2020) (giving the Attorney General authority to make rules and
regulations interpreting the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act’s prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts
or practices); 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1349, 1350-A (2020) (dividing enforcement and rulemaking authority
over Maine’s data breach law between the Department of Professional and Financial Regulation and the
Attorney General).
238. The inclusion of a private right of action has been a major sticking point in the State of
Washington’s proposed Privacy Act. “Privacy advocates argue that a private right of action is essential
for consumers to adequately enforce their privacy rights. Conversely, business advocates argue that a
private right of action (particularly, one that allows for attorney’s fees) would result in endless
litigation.” Megan Herr, Malia Rogers, & David M. Stauss, Washington Privacy Act Update: Private
Right of Action Added in House, SECURITY MAGAZINE (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.securitymagazine.
com/articles/91834-washington-privacy-act-update-private-right-of-action-added-in-house [https://
perma.cc/3WW7-ZQZZ].
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implement, and not every technical violation of a consumer privacy law should
necessarily result in civil liability. The legislature can strike the appropriate balance
between its compliance goals and these industry concerns by qualifying the private
right of action. I suggest three limitations.
First, the law could include a one-year grace period to give companies time to
implement and operationalize the law without fear of incurring civil liabilities. 239
Second, the law could impose a scienter requirement for actions based on a
company’s violation of the law’s individual privacy rights. Such actions could be
cognizable only when the company acted with gross negligence, recklessness, or
intentional misconduct. This scienter requirement would prevent litigants from
seeking damages for violations caused by ordinary mistakes made during the process
of disclosing information, removing someone from a marketing list, deleting
someone’s information, and the like. In contrast, private actions for data breaches
could carry a negligence standard—similar to the CCPA’s standard—to incentivize
best security practices and to protect consumers from the risks of identity theft and
exposure of sensitive personal information. 240 Third, the law could specify a
damages range similar to the CCPA’s range of $100 - $750, or actual damages,
whichever is greater.241 Harms posed by privacy violations are difficult to
quantify.242 Creating a statutory range will reduce uncertainty and make it easier for
individual plaintiffs to vindicate their privacy rights. 243
Automated Decision-Making: Creating basic rules for products and services that
incorporate automated decision-making technologies is particularly important for
Maine at this time. In early 2020, Northeastern University announced the opening
of the Roux Institute in Portland. 244 The Institute provides graduate-level programs
in several disciplines that revolve around automated decision-making
technologies.245 Indeed, the impetus for Lewiston native David Roux’s $100 million
donation to open the Institute was to grow the state’s technology sector by
239. The CCPA contained a similar provision, delaying enforcement of the Act for six months after
its effective date. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185(c) (West 2018) (“The Attorney General shall not
bring an enforcement action under this title until six months after the publication of the final regulations
issued pursuant to this section or July 1, 2020, whichever is sooner.”).
240. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.)
(authorizing a civil action for certain data breaches caused by a “business’s violation of the duty to
implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices”).
241. Id. § 1798.150(a)(1)(A).
242. See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 486 (2010)
(noting that “American tort law in particular tends to focus on identifying and compensating harms that
can be economically quantified,” and that “[i]t is difficult to quantify many privacy harms in this way.”);
Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer
Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 118 (2003) (commenting that “the value of the data profile of any
particular individual is small and difficult to quantify,” and that “requiring victims of consumer profiling
to prove a specific monetary loss [thus] unwarrantedly prejudices their claims.”).
243. See McClurg, supra note 242.
244. Willis Ryder Arnold, Northeastern University Launches $100 Million High-Tech Graduate
Institute in Portland, ME. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.mainepublic.org/post/northeasternuniversity-launches-100-million-high-tech-graduate-institute-portland [https://perma.cc/73SD-D4Y2].
245. See Take Your Academics in a Brave New Direction, THE ROUX INSTIT. AT NE UNIV., https://
roux.northeastern.edu/academics [https://perma.cc/YWW3-U8TU] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (listing
Experiential AI, Computer and Data Sciences, Digital Engineering, and Bioinformatics among the
Institute’s field of studies).
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“work[ing] with Maine-based companies and provid[ing] certificates, master’s
degrees, and Ph.D.s in artificial intelligence and machine learning.” 246
The Roux Institute promises to be a boon for the state’s economy, but the
industry it will foster would benefit from some safeguards to protect residents from
externalities associated with automated decision-making technologies. Left
unchecked, such technologies can inadvertently (or intentionally) be used to
exacerbate existing social inequities and to create new ones. 247
In her book, Weapons of Math Destruction, Cathy O’Neil identifies a harmful
subset of automated decision-making technologies that she calls “WMDs.” As she
explains, WMDs “encode[] human prejudice, misunderstanding, and bias” and tend
to “punish the poor and oppressed in our society, while making the rich richer.” 248
These dangerous automated decision-making technologies tend to share three
common characteristics.
First, WMDs are opaque. Subjects may be unaware that automated decisionmaking technology is being used to make a decision about them. 249 And, even if
they are aware of the technology, they are usually unaware of what inputs the
algorithm uses to make decisions about them and how those inputs are weighed. 250
The lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess whether a decision-making
technology produces unfair results, limits a subject’s ability to challenge the results,
and can “lead to a feeling of unfairness” even if the technology is otherwise fair. 251
Second, WMDs are damaging: they work against the subject’s interest, produce
unfair results, and damage or destroy lives. 252 This damage is usually caused by a
“feedback loop” in the WMD, which occurs when a decision-making technology
lacks feedback to inform whether the decisions it makes are correct.253 Without
feedback, WMDs cannot “learn[] from [their] mistakes” and instead create their own
truths—a teacher is bad because the technology says he is bad, a criminal is
dangerous because the technology says she is dangerous, a job applicant is unreliable
because the technology says he is unreliable—and none of these decisions are
evaluated for accuracy so the technology can be adjusted and improved.254
246. Arnold, supra note 244.
247. See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016) (identifying a harmful subset of automated decisionmaking technologies that O’Neil calls “WMDs”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR
INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? 8-10 (Jan. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/bigdata-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA3EB78B] (listing the ways in which “potential inaccuracies and biases” with big data “might lead to
detrimental effects for low-income and underserved populations”); RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER
TECHNOLOGY (2019) (detailing how the use of big data in automated decision-making technologies
perpetuates systemic racial biases and inequities).
248. O’NEIL, supra note 247, at 3.
249. See id. at 28-29 (describing WMDs as being opaque or invisible).
250. See id. at 28 (“We’re modeled as shoppers and couch potatoes, as patients and loan applicants,
and very little of this do we see . . . .”).
251. Id. at 10, 28-29 (“But you cannot appeal to a WMD. That’s part of their fearsome power. They
do not listen. Nor do they bend. . . . [T]he programs deliver unflinching verdicts, and the human beings
employing them can only shrug, as if to say ‘Hey, what can you do?’”).
252. See id. at 29.
253. See id. at 6-7.
254. Id.
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Third, WMDs are scalable.255 When a WMD has the capacity to “grow
exponentially” a “local nuisance[]” can become a “tsunami force[]” that produces
unfair results across whole sectors of the economy and society. 256
Examples of WMDs, as O’Neil details, are legion. WMDs rank universities, 257
determine what advertisements we see (often to the detriment of the poor and
oppressed),258 identify which neighborhoods to (over)police,259 and make a range of
financially consequential decisions regarding employment, access to credit, and
insurance.260
How do we curb the reach of existing WMDs and prevent the promising bigdata industry in Maine from becoming a laboratory for new ones? Fortunately, there
is a menu of options from which the legislature can choose. O’Neil’s
recommendations include requiring that automated decision-making technologies be
regularly audited for accuracy and fairness; imposing transparency measures to allow
consumers to better understand how the technologies make decisions; and expanding
existing laws that regulate credit reporting agencies, heath care data, and
discrimination to encompass more products that rely on automated decision-making
technologies.261
The GDPR creates a default rule that decisions “based solely on automated
processing” that produce “legal effects” or “similarly significant[]” effects are
prohibited.262 Companies can avoid this rule only when automated processing is
necessary for the performance of a contract, authorized by law, or based on the
subject’s consent. Even in such situations, national law and the controller must
provide “suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and
legitimate interests.”263 At a minimum, controllers must provide the data subject the
right to obtain human intervention in the decision-making and to contest the
decision.264
Finally, the newly-enacted CPRA requires the California Privacy Protection
Agency to address automated decision-making technologies via regulation. The
Agency must promulgate regulations “governing access and opt-out rights with
respect to businesses’ use of automated decision-making technology” including the
right to receive “meaningful information about the logic involved in those
decisionmaking processes, as well as a description of the likely outcome of the
process with respect to the consumer.”265
255. Id. at 29-30.
256. Id. at 30.
257. See id. at Ch. 3 (arguing that the U.S. News’s model for ranking colleges and universities is a
WMD).
258. See id. at Ch. 4 (explaining how for-profit colleges target misleading advertisements to poor
Americans).
259. See id. at Ch. 5 (detailing how the use of crime-prediction programs creates a feedback loop
whereby increased arrests in impoverished neighborhoods leads to over-policing in those
neighborhoods).
260. See id. at Chs. 6-7 (employment), Ch. 8 (credit), Ch. 9 (insurance).
261. Id. at 208-14.
262. GDPR, supra note 171, art. 22.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. California Privacy Rights Act, California Proposition 24 § 21 (2020).
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I recommend taking elements from each of these (somewhat overlapping)
approaches to regulating automated decision-making technologies. Specifically,
Maine should require companies to regularly audit technologies that make automated
decisions about important aspects of life; empower consumers to obtain human
intervention and to contest automated decisions; and endow a regulatory agency with
rulemaking authority to adjust the rules for this rapidly evolving technology.
Additional protections for automated decisions based on sensitive personal
characteristics like race, religion, and gender, and based on proxies for such
characteristics, would also be desirable.
Targeted Advertising: The digital advertising industry is a complex information
ecosystem. Content publishers—such as websites, social media platforms, search
engines, and video platforms—collect vast amounts of personal information from
users and then use that information to allow advertisers to target their ads to highly
specific segments of the platform’s user-base.266 Users’ personal information is also
made available to specialized service providers that assist content publishers and
advertisers in facilitating ad placements or optimizing ad campaigns. 267 The
collection, use, and exchange of personal information adds up to a highly lucrative
and highly effective digital advertising industry. 268 The ability to target digital ads
based on user personal information is the backbone of the industry.269
A lack of clarity in the CCPA regarding whether targeted advertising involves
the “sale” of personal information, as that term is defined by the CCPA, has caused
needless uncertainty and confusion in the implementation of that law. 270 For
example, two of the world’s largest tech companies, Google and Facebook, have
taken opposite positions on whether targeted advertising involves a sale of personal
information under the CCPA and whether consumers thus have a right to opt-out
from targeted advertising.271 The Interactive Advertising Bureau (“IAB”), a digital
advertising industry group, has created a complex CCPA framework in an attempt to
avoid violating the law if California’s Attorney General does interpret the term “sale”
to apply to targeted advertising.272 But this attempt to avoid “selling” personal
266. Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit-Forming Technology, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 137 (2019)
(“[T]argeting requires advertisers to collect as much data as possible about the user—not only
demographic data, but minute-by-minute data about the user’s location, mood, and desires.”).
267. See generally Dina Srinivasan, Why Google Dominates Advertising Markets Competition
Policy Should Lean on the Principles of Financial Market Regulation, 24 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 55, 7076 (2020) (describing the marketplace in which advertisers and publishers purchase and sell digital ads).
268. Russell A. Miller, The Legal Fate of Internet Ad-Blocking, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 299, 30607 (2018) (describing the “mind-boggling growth” of internet advertising revenue).
269. See id. at 307 (describing how online advertising is particularly valuable to marketers because
“digital ads can strategically target consumers in ways that ads in traditional media cannot.”).
270. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(t)(1) (West 2020) (defining “sale” as “selling, renting, releasing,
disclosing, disseminating, making available, transferring, or otherwise communicating orally, in writing,
or by electronic or other means, a consumer’s personal information by the business to a third party for
monetary or other valuable consideration.”).
271. Patience Haggin, Facebook Won’t Change Web Tracking in Response to California Privacy
Law, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2019, 1:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-wont-change-webtracking-in-response-to-california-privacy-law-11576175345 [https://perma.cc/LR6Q-PP3Z]
(contrasting Facebook’s position regarding the CCPA’s definition of “sale” with Google’s position).
272. Interactive Advert. Bureau, IAB CCPA Compliance Framework for Publishers & Technology
Companies Version 1.0, (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/IAB_CCPA-
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information without disrupting the above-described information ecosystem has
drawn criticism from Californians for Consumer Privacy, which believes the IAB’s
framework still runs afoul of consumers’ right to opt-out from sales.273
Maine should avoid this confusion by clearly stating how the prospective
consumer privacy law applies to business’s use of personal information in targeted
advertising. One option would be to create a specific right to opt-out from targeted
advertising and to clearly explain what happens when a consumer exercises that
right. In particular, the law should explain what personal information can and cannot
be used for advertising purposes once a user opts-out. The opt-out right could be
structured such that platforms cannot use any personal information for targeting ads
once a user opts-out. Or, the opt-out could be narrowed such that platforms could
still target ads based on a limited set of personal information that poses minimal
privacy risks.274 Regardless of the ultimate contours of the opt-out right, the
legislature should make those contours clear to avoid the type of uncertainty caused
by the CCPA.
Updating Maine’s Breach Notification Statute: As part of a general consumer
privacy law, Maine should update its data breach notification statute to provide
consumers with greater protections in the event of a breach. First, Maine should
expand the statute’s definition of “personal information.” Currently, the term only
covers basic types of personal information that lead to a risk of identity theft when
breached: social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, account numbers and
passwords, and the like. 275 Companies that experience breaches of other types of
personal information thus do not need to report the breach to consumers under Maine
law.
The scope of the statute’s definition of personal information made sense when
it was enacted in 2005, as the legislature’s chief concern was preventing identity theft
caused by data breaches. However, companies today are collecting many more types
of personal information and breaches of such information can have consequences
beyond identity theft. Other states thus maintain breach notification laws with
definitions of personal information that encompass categories such as biometric
information, DNA profiles, medical or health information, certain electronic

Compliance-Framework-for-Publishers-Technology-Companies.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJZ2-PXEV].
Under the Framework, when a consumer opts-out from the sale of their personal information, the
content publisher automatically sends a signal to all of the downstream companies involved in targeting
advertisements on the publisher’s platform. The signal triggers a series of contractual arrangements that
restrict how the downstream companies can use the consumer’s personal information. Id. As of this
writing, it is unclear whether the contractual arrangements created by the Framework comply with the
CCPA’s opt-out requirements.
273. See Californians for Consumer Privacy Comments on IAB’s Proposed CCPA Framework,
CALIFORNIANS FOR CONSUMER PRIV. (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.caprivacy.org/californians-forconsumer-privacy-comments-on-iabs-proposed-ccpa-framework/ [https://perma.cc/K8ZQ-GBXD]
(arguing that the Framework “would contravene certain express tenets of CCPA”).
274. For example, advertisements could continue to be targeted based on how users engage with the
platform during their web-session (e.g., displaying an ad because someone clicked a particular link on a
webpage); based on the website from which the user was referred to the platform (e.g., showing users a
basketball-related advertisement when they visit a platform from NBA.com); and based on high-level
geolocation information (e.g., showing a local advertisement to users located in Portland, Maine).
275. 10 M.R.S.A. § 1347(6) (2019).
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identifiers, digital signatures, and work evaluations. 276 At a minimum, Maine should
expand its definition of personal information to require companies to report breaches
of biometric information, DNA profiles, and health information. Consumers ought
to know when an unauthorized party accesses these categories of deeply personal
information.
Second, Maine’s breach notification law does not provide a private right of
action, relying instead on the DPFR or the Attorney General to protect consumers
through enforcement actions. Maine could empower consumers to vindicate their
own rights by adopting the DPFR’s 2006 recommendation and providing a limited
private right of action for actual damages caused by the failure to investigate or
timely notify consumers of a breach.277 Many other states and territories already
provide their residents with a private right of action for violations of data breach
notification laws in certain circumstances.278
***
Fortunately, Maine already has a Maine-specific legislative model from which
to draw in fashioning a consumer privacy law for the state. During the committee
proceedings for Maine’s ISP legislation, an amendment that would have replaced the
bill with a general consumer privacy law was introduced and defeated. 279 The
amendment would have (1) imposed disclosure obligations on businesses that collect
personal information,280 (2) given consumers rights to know and to opt-out similar
to Californians’ parallel CCPA rights, 281 (3) required businesses to conduct risk
assessments regarding their use of personal information, 282 and (4) allowed the
Attorney General to enforce the law through civil actions.283 To be sure, this failed
amendment would need revising to conform to the suggestions I offer here, but it
presents a good foundation from which to build a law that adequately safeguards the
privacy of Maine residents.

276. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 18-551(11)(f), (l) (2020) (including medical information and
biometric information in the definition of “specific data element”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B101(7)(a)(6), (8) (2018) (including medical information and biometric information); FLA. STAT. §
501.171(1)(g)(1)(a)(IV) (2020) (including medical information); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
530/5(1)(D) (LexisNexis 2020) (including medical information); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-61(10) (2020);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01(4)(a)(7), (10) (2019) (including medical information and digital
signatures); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 4051(a)(5), (7) (2020) (including medical information and workrelated evaluations); WIS. STAT. § 134.98(1)(b)(4)-(5) (2020) (including DNA profile and biometric
data).
277. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text (discussing the DPFR’s report).
278. See, e.g., Breach Notification Law Interactive Map, BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, https://
www.bakerlaw.com/BreachNotificationLawMap [https://perma.cc/RL77-P9XY] (last visited Apr. 11,
2021) (showing over a dozen states and territories that provide a private right of action).
279. See An Act to Protect the Privacy of Online Customer Information: Hearing on L.D. 946 Before
the Comm. on Energy, Utilities and Tech., 129th Legis. 112-118 (Me. 2019), available from Me. State
Law & Leg. Reference Library by requesting cf129-LD-0946.pdf.
280. Id. § 172(1).
281. Id. § 172(2)-(3).
282. Id. § 173.
283. Id. § 176.
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B. Mitigating Specific Privacy Threats
To supplement a general consumer privacy law, Maine should continue to
address privacy threats posed by emerging technologies, as the state has done
repeatedly in the past. Responses to new technologies can come in the form of
amendments to the general consumer privacy law, additions or amendments to other
sections of Maine law, or through regulations promulgated by the state agency vested
with rulemaking authority under the general consumer privacy law. In this Section,
I identify five privacy threats caused or exacerbated by recent advances in
technology that warrant a specific legislative or regulatory response from the state:
(1) facial recognition technology; (2) biometric information; (3) smart-home
devices; (4) data brokers; and (5) the Maine Information and Analysis Center.
Facial Recognition Technology: Facial recognition technology, or facial
surveillance technology, “uses algorithms designed to analyze images of human
faces” to allow the user to identify a person based on an image of their face.284 “In
one form of facial surveillance technology,” for example, “a computer program
analyzes an image of a person’s face, taking measurements of their facial features to
create a unique ‘faceprint.’”285 These faceprints can then be used “in combination
with databases like the driver’s license system at the Bureau of Motor Vehicles and
surveillance camera networks, to identify and track people en masse.” 286
The technology poses serious risks to privacy and liberty when it is used by law
enforcement and other government agencies. Facial recognition can be paired with
networks of public surveillance cameras to “easily and continuously track everyone’s
public movements,” threatening the conditions that allow fundamental freedoms like
speech, association, and religion.287 The technology can also exacerbate existing
social inequities and create new ones. For example, face surveillance systems used
by law enforcement often compare images against mugshot databases. Because
Black and Latino people are historically more likely to be arrested than white people
for committing the same crimes, “[u]sing mugshot databases for face surveillance
searches exacerbates historical inequities by recycling that bias through new
technology, and unfairly scrutinizing people who have long been targets of
disproportionate police attention.”288 Recognizing these dangers, cities such as San
Francisco, Oakland, and Boston have banned city agencies from using facial
recognition technology, while other cities and states have implemented partial
restrictions.289
In Maine, the City of Portland has been a leader on this front. The City Council
284. Michael Kebede, An Open Letter to Portland City Council on Facial Recognition, ACLU OF
ME. (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.aclumaine.org/en/news/open-letter-portland-city-council-facialrecognition [https://perma.cc/9UGS-UYGY].
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. (arguing that the use of face surveillance technologies poses a threat to First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights).
288. Id.
289. See id. (listing state localities that have banned law enforcement use of facial recognition
technology); Ally Jarmanning, Boston Bans Use of Facial Recognition Technology. It's the 2nd-Largest
City To Do So, WBUR (June 24, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/06/23/boston-facialrecognition-ban [https://perma.cc/Y6ZU-92B5].
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unanimously voted to ban the use of facial recognition technology by the city and by
city officials in August 2020.290 Two months later, voters approved a ballot initiative
that replaced the city’s prohibition on facial recognition technology in favor of a
prohibition with more stringent enforcement mechanisms. 291 The initiative,
Question B, includes a private right of action against the City of Portland and
includes a bar on using evidence obtained in violation of the section in court. 292
Maine should regulate government use of facial surveillance technology on the
state level to create a uniform policy. There is no reason why a person in Portland
should have greater protections for their privacy than someone a couple miles down
the road in Westbrook or a couple hundred miles up the road in Caribou. Indeed, the
legislature has already indicated that the privacy intrusions posed by facial
surveillance technology require a state-level solution. The state’s “Act to Protect the
Privacy of Citizens from Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” prohibits the use of
facial recognition technology in drones.293 The legislature should extend that
prohibition to all other mediums and prohibit the government from using facial
recognition entirely.294
Proponents of the technology may assert that the government should be allowed
to install facial surveillance systems and to access the systems in emergency
situations. But, “emergency powers . . . tend to kindle emergencies.” 295 In my view,
the risk is too high that, if facial recognition technology is allowed to be deployed,
established safeguards will be eroded and the creep of authoritarianism will persist.
Biometric Information: There is perhaps no type of information more personal
than information about your person.296 New technologies can collect and use
identifying information about your face, eyes, voice, and fingerprints; data about
your sleep habits, breathing pattern, and heart rate; and even your unique human
genome.297 These technologies have their benefits but carry attendant privacy risks.

290. Portland, Me., Code §§ 17-129 to -132 (Aug. 3, 2020).
291. Question B, An Act to Ban Facial Surveillance by Public Officials in Portland, PORTLAND,
ME., https://www.portlandmaine.gov/DocumentCenter/View/29039/Ballot-Question-Initiativelanguage-Nov-2020 [https://perma.cc/R89Q-NUUD] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
292. Id. § 17-132.
293. Me. P.L. 2015, ch. 307, § 1 (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(5)(D)).
294. Like the City of Boston’s ban on facial surveillance technologies, narrow carve-outs can be
established for using the technology for user authentication. See Boston, Ma., Ordinance Docket 0683
(June 24, 2020), Ordinance Banning Face Surveillance Technology in Boston, http://meetingrecords.
cityofboston.gov/sirepub/mtgviewer.aspx?meetid=511&doctype=minutes&itemid=33202 [https://
perma.cc/QRR2-N39Z] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (codified at BOSTON, MA., MUN. CODE §16-62
(2020)).
295. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
296. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long interpreted the Constitution to include privacy protections
for decisions about the body. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that
the Constitution includes a right to privacy that protects a married couple's ability to be counseled in the
use of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the Constitution’s right of
privacy “is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”).
297. See, e.g., ZUBOFF, supra note 122, at 236 (describing a “smart” mattress that collects data on
users’ heart rates, breathing, and movements); id. at 246 (describing biometric data that can be collected
through wearable technologies); IGO, supra note 2, at 359 (describing how biometric identifiers such as
facial recognition, fingerprinting, retina scanning, voice spectrometry, and DNA typing have “migrated
from criminal justice into the society at large in recent decades”); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the
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Just like other types of personal information, biometric information collected by
companies can be used and shared for purposes beyond what consumers would
reasonably expect. Because the information is deeply personal and immutable, the
harms posed by such misuses of biometric information can be substantial.
These concerns have led Illinois, Washington, and Texas to specifically regulate
the use of some biometric information. 298 The most important of these laws is the
Illinois “Biometric Information Privacy Act” (“BIPA”). Unlike the biometric
information privacy laws enacted by Washington and Texas, Illinois included a
private right of action, which has led to suits against companies including Facebook,
Google, and Shutterfly.299
The BIPA defines biometric information to encompass information about retina
or iris scans, fingerprints, voiceprints, and scans of the “hand or face geometry.” 300
The law imposes five restrictions on companies that collect such information. First,
companies must receive consent prior to collecting or otherwise obtaining biometric
information.301 Second, companies are prohibited from selling or otherwise profiting
from a person’s biometric information. 302 Third, companies must obtain consent
before disclosing biometric information to another party. 303 Fourth, the law imposes
a “reasonable standard of care” on companies to safeguard biometric information.304
Finally, companies must maintain a written policy providing that biometric
information be destroyed upon the earlier of: (a) the date on which the original
purpose for collecting the information has been satisfied; and (b) three years from
the individual’s last interaction with the company. 305
Maine should enact a biometric information privacy law similar to the BIPA but
with a broader definition of “biometric information.” When Illinois enacted the
BIPA it was chiefly concerned with the use of biometric information for identity
verification in financial transactions and security screenings. 306 These identity
Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93
TEX. L. REV. 85, 88 (2014) (listing numerous devices that collect biometric information).
298. For example, when Illinois enacted the state’s Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), the
legislature expressed a particular concern for the privacy risks posed by requiring consumers to verify
their identities via biometric information in order to access a financial account. See 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. §§ 14/1-99 (2008). “Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers that are used to access
finances or other sensitive information. For example, social security numbers, when compromised, can
be changed. Biometrics, however, are biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once
compromised, the individual has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to
withdraw from biometric-facilitated transactions.” Id. § 14/5. The legislature also declared that
regulating biometric information as necessary because “[t]he full ramifications of biometric technology
are not fully known.” Id.
299. In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Rivera v.
Google, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16 C 10984, 2017
WL 4099846 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017).
300. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 14/10.
301. See id. § 14/15(b).
302. See id. § 14/15(c).
303. See id. § 14/15(d). This consent requirement contains narrow exceptions for certain financial
transactions, disclosures required by law, and disclosures required by a warrant or subpoena. Id.
304. Id. § 14/15(e).
305. See id. § 14/15(a).
306. See id. § 14/5(a) (“The use of biometrics is growing in the business and security screening
sectors and appears to promise streamlined financial transactions and security screenings.”).
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verification services generally rely on the types of biometric information listed in the
BIPA. However, companies are now using a broader range of biometric information
for a wider variety of purposes; a trend that is almost certain to continue. Maine’s
biometric information law should reflect this development.
Smart-Home Devices: The home has been considered the penultimate zone of
privacy for centuries.307 In the common law and in American constitutional law,
courts have employed the maxim that a “person’s house is their castle” to guard the
home from unwanted government intrusions. 308 The home is also expected to be
secured from the intrusions of private parties. Through the physical construction of
homes with solid doors and window curtains to social customs like knocking before
entering, our culture has made a home’s occupant the master of who may view and
access their home’s interior.309 This authority is enshrined by trespass, nuisance,
burglary, criminal invasion of privacy, and similar laws providing relief for
unwanted intrusions on real property.
In recent years, the sanctuary of the home has come under threat from a growing
body of devices that collect information from the home’s interior. These smart-home
devices include internet-connected security systems, lights, refrigerators, heating and
cooling systems, vacuums, televisions, door-locks, and more.310 Smart-home
devices collect data from the home and transmit that data to the device manufacturer
who can monetize it in several ways.311 For example, in 2017 iRobot announced that
307. See, e.g., William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Speech on the Excise Bill, House of Commons (Mar.
1763) (“The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail;
its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King
of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!”), quoted in
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
308. See, e.g., Miller, 357 U.S. at 306-07 (“From earliest days, the common law drastically limited
the authority of law officers to break the door of a house to effect an arrest. Such action invades the
precious interest of privacy summed up in the ancient adage that a man's house is his castle.”); Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 596-97 (1980) (“The zealous and frequent repetition of the adage that a ‘man's
house is his castle,’ made it abundantly clear that both in England and in the Colonies ‘the freedom of
one’s house’ was one of the most vital elements of English liberty.”); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S.
103, 115 (2006) (“We have . . . lived our whole national history with an understanding of ‘the ancient
adage that a man's house is his castle . . . .’”). I have intentionally removed the gendered language from
the adage in the body of this article to avoid perpetuating its inherent sexism. I have left the original
language in the cases cited in this footnote for historical accuracy.
309. Customs regarding household privacy vary by culture. In Privacy and Freedom, Westin
describes a contemporaneous study of Javanese households to provide a contrast to household privacy
norms in the U.S. In Java, “[t]he houses face the street with a cleared front yard in front of them. There
are no walls or fences around them, the house walls are thinly and loosely woven, and there are
commonly not even doors. Within the house people wander freely just about any place any time, and
even outsiders wander in fairly freely almost any time during the day and early evening.” WESTIN,
supra note 2, at 16 (quoting a study by Clifford Geertz comparing household-privacy practices in Bali
and Java). However, even in societies where persons freely enter each other’s homes, “there will
usually be rules limiting what a person may touch or where he may go within the house. There will also
be norms limiting family conversation or acts performed while the outsiders are present.” Id. at 15.
310. Smart-home devices constitute a subset of devices that are commonly referred to as the
“Internet of Things” (IoT). See, e.g., Peppet, supra note 297, at 88-89 (listing IoT devices including
household devices such as thermostats, ovens, refrigerators, and home electricity and water-usage
trackers).
311. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center to the
FTC on the Privacy and Security Implications of the Internet of Things, 12 (June 1, 2013),
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it would monetize floor plans of consumers’ homes created from the Roomba’s
mapping technology.312 The company then equipped the vacuum with new sensors,
cameras, and software to facilitate its mapping function. 313 Vizio used its line of
smart TVs to capture billions of data points about users’ viewing habits then sold
users’ viewing histories to advertisers and others.314 By 2015, Samsung’s smart TVs
were “recording everything said in the vicinity of the TV” and sending the recordings
to be transcribed by a third party.315 A participant in the FTC’s 2015 study on the
“Internet of Things” (“IoT”) shared that fewer than 10,000 households using their
company’s interior-home device generated 150 million data points, or
“approximately one data point every six seconds for each household.” 316
The astounding amount of personal data collected from the home’s interior by
smart-home appliances is surpassed only by another type of smart-home device: the
digital personal assistant. A digital personal assistant serves two primary functions
for the user. First, it is the central nervous system for the home’s other smart-home
devices. The personal assistant integrates with the home’s smart lights, cameras,
locks, and appliances such that a user can control all these things with a voice
command—“Hey Google, turn on the lights.” “Hey Alexa, change the channel.”
Second, the personal assistant allows the user to conduct a variety of daily tasks
through voice commands, including searching the internet, playing music, ordering
goods, calling friends, and more.
These functions combine to allow the companies that produce digital personal
assistants to monetize data about “a theoretically limitless scope of animate and
inanimate domestic activities: conversations, lightbulbs, queries, schedules,
movement, travel planning, heating systems, purchases, home security, health
concerns, music, communication functions, and more.” 317 Conversations and
activities once thought to occur in the sanctuary of the home are thus “eagerly
rendered as surplus” to be sold by the titans of industry to advertisers and other
purchasers who may find such data useful.318
To be sure, homeowners willingly put these devices in their homes and often
https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/EPIC-FTC-IoT-Cmts.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKS4-B8NN] [hereinafter “EPIC
Comments”] (“Smart devices could reveal a wealth of information about consumers’ location, media
consumption, activity patterns, associations, lifestyle, age, income, gender, race, and health—
information with potential commercial value. Companies might attempt to exploit this data by using it
to target advertising or selling it directly.”).
312. ZUBOFF, supra note 122, at 235; see also Josh Hafner & Edward C. Baig, Your Roomba
Already Maps Your Home. Now the CEO Plans to Sell the Map, USA TODAY (July 25, 2017, 12:36
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/nation-now/2017/07/25/roomba-plans-sell-maps-usershomes/508578001/ [https://perma.cc/8YW7-F35U] (quoting iRobot CEO Colin Angle as declaring that
“there's an entire ecosystem of things and services that the smart home can deliver once you have a rich
map of the home that the user has allowed to be shared”).
313. ZUBOFF, supra note 122, at 235; Hafner & Baid, supra note 312.
314. ZUBOFF, supra note 122, at 265.
315. Id. at 264.
316. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD
14 (FTC Staff Report 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-tradecommission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/27QR-JJQJ] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
317. ZUBOFF, supra note 122, at 262.
318. Id. at 261.
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find the devices beneficial or convenient. But this is no defense to the privacy
intrusions posed by smart-home devices. Homeowners may not appreciate the extent
to which the devices collect information or the extent to which companies use and
share the information. In this sense, the devices exceed the scope of the owner’s
invitation into their home like a houseguest who snoops through their drawers or
surreptitiously records their dinner conversation. They may also create an avenue
for hackers to access the home’s interior; a house-sitter who fails to safeguard your
keys, if you will.319
Careful regulation is necessary to protect privacy in the home while also
allowing homeowners to enjoy the benefits of smart-home devices. While there are
different ways to strike this balance, I suggest incorporating three elements into
legislation or regulation governing smart-home devices.
First, companies should be required to obtain consumers’ express opt-in consent
before using data from smart-home devices for secondary purposes such as targeted
advertising or sales to third parties. Such uses are simply not in line with consumers’
reasonable expectations and consumers should not be required to submit to having
their interior-home data sold as a condition for using a smart-home device. This
consent requirement could be paired with an anti-discrimination protection such that
if the consumer declines to consent to the secondary use, the device must still
function to the extent possible.320
Second, Maine should establish a data-minimization requirement for smarthome devices. Companies should only be allowed to collect information that is
necessary or desirable for device functionality and improvement.321 Your
refrigerator probably does not need to record your conversations, track your music
preferences, or log your travel schedule.
Third, if the state does not enact a general consumer privacy law that requires
companies to take reasonable security measures and grants a private right of action
for data breaches caused by a violation of that duty, the state should impose such a
requirement on companies that produce smart-home devices given the security risks
posed by a third-party gaining access to a consumer’s locks, security cameras,
thermostat, and more. 322
Data Brokers: Data brokers are businesses that amass consumer personal
information from sources other than consumers themselves and then sell that

319. See Hayley Peterson, Wisconsin Couple Describe the Chilling Moment That a Hacker Cranked
Up Their Heat and Started Talking to Them Through a Google Nest Camera in Their Kitchen, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 25, 2019, 4:12 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/hacker-breaks-into-smart-homegoogle-nest-devices-terrorizes-couple-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/M7NY-D8VX]; Stephen Gandel,
Hackers Target Home Security Cameras: “I'm Coming for Your Baby”, CBS NEWS (Dec. 13, 2019,
3:37 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ring-and-nest-hackers-home-security-cameras-vulnerable-tocyberattacks/ [https://perma.cc/6GQU-ZMQM].
320. See EPIC Comments, supra note 311, at 18 (proposing a consent requirement and arguing that
for consent to be effective “companies must not be allowed to condition use of a service on unnecessary
data collection”).
321. See id. at 20 (proposing a data minimization requirement).
322. California recently enacted legislation requiring all IoT devices to have reasonable security
features. The legislation does not include a private right of action. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.91.04–.06
(West 2020).
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personal information to third parties.323 These companies collect data from public
records, other publicly available sources, and commercial databases.324 They then
supplement this data with “certain derived data, which they infer about
consumers.”325 For instance, “a data broker might infer that an individual with a
boating license has an interest in boating.” 326 By combining this collected and
inferred information, data brokers can build detailed profiles of nearly every
American adult, which can then be packaged into marketable products.
A 2014 Federal Trade Commission report examined nine data brokers who offer
marketing products, risk mitigation products, or “people search” products. The
marketing products allow companies to purchase information about their customers
(or potential customers) to facilitate marketing efforts and to analyze their customerbase’s data to improve ad targeting.327 Risk mitigation products assist companies in
confirming their customers’ identities or in assessing the likelihood a particular
transaction is fraudulent.328 For example,
data brokers offer their clients a quiz product, which typically includes questions to
which the answers should be easily known to the consumer, but would not likely
appear in information stolen by an identity thief . . . . Questions might include:
“Which of these is an email address you have used?” or “What is your mother’s
birthday?”329

Lastly, “people-search” products allow users to search the data brokers’
information database to locate information about a particular person.330 Database
information may include court records, property records, social media information,
demographic information, and employment history. 331
The amount of information data brokers collect and infer to create these products
is truly astounding. “[O]ne data broker’s database has information on 1.4 billion
consumer transactions and over 700 billion aggregated data elements . . . another
data broker adds three billion new records each month to its databases, . . . [while
another] has 3000 data segments for nearly every U.S. consumer.” 332
The FTC’s report confirmed the obvious: data brokers pose significant privacy
323. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.99.80(d) (West 2020) (defining “data broker” as “a business
that knowingly collects and sells to third parties the personal information of a consumer with whom the
business does not have a direct relationship”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2014) [hereinafter “FTC DATA BROKERS REPORT”]
(defining “data brokers” as “companies whose primary business is collecting personal information about
consumers from a variety of sources and aggregating, analyzing, and sharing that information, or
information derived from it, for purposes such as marketing products, verifying an individual’s identity,
or detecting fraud”).
324. FTC DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 323, at 11-14 (concluding that data brokers collect
data from three categories of sources: government sources, other publicly available sources, and
commercial sources).
325. Id. at ii.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 23-31 (detailing the various marketing products offered by data brokers).
328. Id. at 32.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 34.
331. Id. (listing the particular types of information available to users through a people search).
332. Id. at 46-47.
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risks for consumers.333 They piece together a wealth of personal information from
numerous sources to create a “detailed composite of the consumer’s life,” and they
do so without the consumer’s knowledge. 334 When they use this information to
design marketing products, they group consumers into different categories—
including categories that track ethnicity and income level—or assign them different
“scores” based on their personal information. 335 These groupings dictate what
advertisements consumers see, which can in turn impact which products they buy
and what services they receive.336 When data brokers use their troves of personal
information to create people-search products, they could be “facilitat[ing]
harassment, or even stalking, and may expose domestic violence victims, law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, public officials, or other individuals to retaliation
or other harm.”337 And, regardless of how they use the data, storing such large
quantities of personal information inherently carries privacy risks attendant to a
breach.338 This is a fact that approximately 250 Mainers learned first-hand during
the ChoicePoint data breach that led the state to enact its breach notification law.
Two states have enacted laws governing data brokers in response to these
privacy concerns. Vermont was the first state to do so when, in 2017, it enacted
legislation creating a data broker registry. 339 Data brokers are required to annually
register with the Vermont Secretary of State, to provide the company’s contact
information, and to provide information about whether and how a consumer can optout from the collection or sale of personal information. 340 The Secretary of State
then publishes this information in a publicly available, online database so that anyone
can contact the data broker.341 Importantly, the data broker registry is only a
transparency measure. It does not create a right to opt-out from the collection or sale
of personal information; Vermont law only requires data brokers to be transparent
about whether consumers can opt-out, what activity they can opt-out of (e.g.,
collection or sales), and what they need to do to opt-out.342
333. The FTC’s conclusion that data brokers’ practices result in intrusions to consumers’ privacy is
shared by consumers themselves. The results of an empirical study published in 2017 show that
consumers are deeply uncomfortable with data-brokers accessing their personal information, even when
that information comes from a public source. See Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy
Interests in Public Records: An Empirical Investigation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 140 (2017)
(“Accessing [public record] information through the use of a data broker is consistently perceived as
inappropriate, even when the type of information accessed and the receiver of the information are
judged to be appropriate.”).
334. FTC DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 323, at 46.
335. Id. at 47-48 (noting data-brokers’ scoring system and listing groups such as “‘Urban Scramble’
and ‘Mobile Mixers,’ both of which include a high concentration of Latinos and African Americans with
low incomes”).
336. See id. at 48 (noting that a low score could result in a consumer being “limited to ads for
subprime credit or receiving different levels of service from companies”).
337. Id.
338. Id. at 48-49 (“[I]dentity thieves and other unscrupulous actors may be attracted to the collection
of consumer profiles that would give them a clear picture of consumers’ habits over time, thereby
enabling them to predict passwords, challenge questions, or other authentication credentials.”).
339. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2446 (2019) (creating a data broker registry).
340. Id. at § 2446(a).
341. See Vermont Data Broker Registry, https://bizfilings.vermont.gov/online/DatabrokerInquire/
[https://perma.cc/5FPF-LW54] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
342. VT. STAT. ANN. § 2446(a)(3)(B)(i)-(iii).
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In addition to the registration requirement, the Vermont law imposes affirmative
information-security obligations on data brokers and creates a private right of action
for violations of the security requirements. 343 The law also prohibits the acquisition
of brokered personal information through fraudulent means, for purposes of stalking
or harassment, for purposes of discriminating, or for committing fraud. 344
Consumers have a private right of action to enforce these prohibitions.345
More recently, California amended the CCPA to create a data broker registry.346
The registry requires data brokers to list: (a) their name and contact information;
and (b) “[a]ny additional information or explanation the data broker chooses to
provide concerning its data collection practices.”347 The amendment does not create
any new rights for consumers, though the CCPA already provides them the right to
opt-out from the sale of their personal information. 348
Maine should adopt a law similar to Vermont’s and California’s and require data
brokers to annually register with the Secretary of State. Establishing a registry is an
important transparency measure. Since data brokers collect information from thirdparty sources, consumers need a registry to know which companies to contact about
opting out of the collection or sale of their personal information.
Other desirable features of a Maine data broker law depend on whether the state
also enacts a general consumer privacy law, and on what rights and obligations that
law respectively creates for consumers and businesses. Whether located in a general
consumer privacy law or a specific data broker law, the state should ensure that
residents have the right to know what personal information data brokers collect and
sell.349 Maine law could also empower residents to opt-out from data brokers
building profiles about them for marketing purposes, from data brokers selling their
personal information, and from data brokers disclosing their compiled information
to the public in people-search products.350 This latter right—the right to opt-out from
being listed in people-search products—is particularly important for victims of
cyber-harassment and stalking that the legislature has repeatedly acted to protect.
343. See id. § 2447 (detailing the security requirements and stating that “[a] person who violates a
provision of this section commits an unfair and deceptive act in commerce in violation” of Vermont’s
consumer protection laws).
344. See id. § 2431.
345. Id. § 2431(b)(1).
346. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.99.80–.88 (West 2020).
347. Id.
348. See supra Section (II)(A)(2) (discussing the individual rights created by the CCPA).
349. This recommendation aligns with the FTC’s recommendation that Congress consider legislation
requiring data brokers to give consumers access to their data. See FTC DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra
note 323, at 50.
350. The FTC report also recommended that consumers be allowed to opt-out from having their data
shared for marketing purposes and from being listed in “people search” results. Id. at 50, 54. The FTC
recommends giving consumers other rights as well, including a right to correct inaccurate information
contained in a “people search” listing. Id. at 54. The FTC recommendations regarding risk mitigation
products are more circumscribed, focusing on increasing transparency rather than vesting consumers
with opt-out rights. Id. at 53-54. Data brokers’ use of personal information to create risk mitigation
products present less privacy risks and pose greater benefits to consumers than do the other ways in
which data brokers use personal information. In balancing these risks and benefits, providing
consumers a right to opt-out from data brokers’ use of publicly available information for risk mitigation
products is likely not necessary at this time.
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Finally, Maine could create a universal opt-out list, much like the National Do Not
Call Registry.351 Creating such a list would allow residents to exercise their opt-out
rights for all data brokers at once, rather than having to navigate the opt-out process
for each broker individually.
The Maine Information and Analysis Center (“MIAC”): The MIAC is a law
enforcement information-sharing center established by executive order and operated
jointly by the Maine Emergency Management Agency and the Maine State Police. 352
Known as a “fusion center,” the MIAC is one cog in a national network of
information-sharing centers established in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to improve
the nation’s intelligence-sharing practices.353 Following that tragedy, “policymakers
argued that government agencies could have prevented the attacks if they had
‘connected the dots’ by synthesizing and analyzing available information.” 354 The
creation of fusion centers to collect and share information between local, state,
federal, and private-sector sources was a response to this perceived shortcoming.355
In the two decades since 9/11, fusion centers have become the target of frequent
criticism regarding both their effectiveness as an intelligence tool and their intrusions
on individual liberties. Critics assert that the increase in digital information sharing
fostered by fusion centers does not, “actually lead[] to more actionable intelligence
than it impedes.”356 The glut of information can instead make it difficult for analysts
to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information, and accurate leads from
inaccurate leads, amounting to a massive waste of valuable time and resources. 357
Indeed, a U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
investigation failed to identify a single instance where a fusion center helped to
identify a terrorist threat or to disrupt an active terrorist plot. 358

351. Fed. Trade Comm’n, National Do Not Call Registry, https://donotcall.gov [https://perma.cc/
9B4P-S7AQ](last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
352. Me. Exec. Order No. 24 FY 06/07 (Dec. 8, 2006) (“An Order Establishing the Maine
Intelligence Analysis Center”), https://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic=Gov_
Executive_Orders&id=28092&v=Article [https://perma.cc/3CGK-YYBS] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
353. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A
Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 264 (2013) (“Since 9/11, a surveillance
state has been in development, accomplished in part by a network of fusion centers through which
government agents and private-sector representatives ‘collect and share’ information and intelligence.”).
354. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence
Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1448 (2011).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1456.
357. See id. at 1457 (“Analytical tools produce many false leads, draining scarce resources away
from more effective crime-fighting endeavors. Amidst the false positives, analysts may find it difficult
to find relevant information. They also spend valuable time investigating innocent individuals.”).
358. U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFS., FED. SUPPORT FOR AN INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 2
(Oct. 3, 2012), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-3-2012%20PSI%20STAFF%20
REPORT%20re%20FUSION%20CENTERS.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NVX-NRDS]; Brendan
McQuade, Investigate and Shut Down the Maine Information and Analysis Center, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS (June 13, 2020), https://bangordailynews.com/2020/06/13/opinion/contributors/investigate-andshut-down-the-maine-information-and-analysis-center/ [https://perma.cc/EHX5-DHZU] (quoting the
U.S. Senate Committee investigation in support of the proposition that fusion centers are a “failed
policy”); see also Citron & Pasquale, supra note 354, at 1456 (“Although fusion centers have
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From the civil liberties perspective, three related factors have spurred calls for
reform. First, the scope of fusion centers’ missions have drastically expanded from
their counter-terrorism origins to encompass all types of general crime prevention.359
This “mission creep” has led to concerns that the post-9/11 state of emergency
originally used to justify the centers’ creation has normalized what amounts to a
domestic surveillance program. 360 Second, the massive volume of information
shared within and between fusion centers has led to privacy concerns common to
most any large government database: Is the collection, use, storage, and sharing of
information transparent, appropriate, and secure, and what recourse do people have
if information about them is inaccurate or incomplete? 361 Third, fusion centers have
regularly conducted surveillance on groups engaging in protest activities, leading to
concerns that they pose a threat to First Amendment speech and associational
rights.362
These civil liberty and privacy concerns came to a head in Maine during the
summer of 2020. On May 7, 2020, a Maine State Trooper filed a complaint in federal
district court alleging that the MIAC retaliated against him for blowing the whistle
on the MIAC’s illegal surveillance activity.363 The complaint alleged that the MIAC
“completely ignores its own privacy policy, the federal Privacy Act, and that it
regularly engages in violations of state law, federal law, and rules of criminal
procedure.”364 This alleged misconduct includes collecting, retaining, and sharing
data on “individuals associated with lawful public protests . . . .”365 For example, the
MIAC allegedly monitored protests against CMP’s transmission line project and

contributed to crime-fighting in cases where they assist ongoing investigations, they have generated
little valuable intelligence about future threats, crimes, or hazards.”).
359. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 354, at 1463-65 (describing how fusion centers have
expanded from an anti-terrorism focus to an “all hazards, all crimes, all threats” mission).
360. Id.; see also Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship
Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1051 (2018) (describing how fusion centers’ “mission became
unmoored from their antiterror beginnings to cover all crimes, threats, and hazards”).
361. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 354, at 1464-65 (discussing transparency concerns).
The collaborative aspect of fusion center—which involves information sharing between different states
and between the states and the federal government—may exacerbate the privacy concerns ordinarily
attendant to government databases. It can be unclear whether state law (and, which state’s law) or
federal law supplies the privacy protections for information shared through fusion centers. See id. at
1467-69.
362. See id. at 1444-46 (describing how the Minnesota fusion center monitored protestors at the
2008 Republican National Convention and how the Maryland fusion center “conducted surveillance of
human rights groups, peace activists, and death penalty opponents”); see also Alleen Brown et al.,
Standing Rock Documents Expose Inner Workings of “Surveillance-Industrial Complex,” THE
INTERCEPT (June 3, 2017, 11:57 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/06/03/standing-rock-documentsexpose-inner-workings-of-surveillance-industrial-complex/ [https://perma.cc/8Q3X-2LJR] (describing
the North Dakota fusion center’s involvement in surveilling Dakota Access pipeline protesters at
Standing Rock); Shawn Musgrave, Why Was the Austin Counterterrorism Unit Monitoring Vegan
Potlucks?, MUCKROCK (May 7, 2015), https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2015/may/07/veganpotlucks-anime-screenings-counterrorism-unit/ [https://perma.cc/JKZ4-N9QZ] (describing emails
released from the Austin, TX fusion center showing that the center monitored animal rights activists).
363. Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at ¶¶ 13-16, Loder v. Me. Intel. Analysis Ctr., No. 2:20-cv00157-JDL (D. Me. May 7, 2020).
364. Id. at ¶¶ 57, 63.
365. Id. ¶59.
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shared its information with CMP.366 The MIAC also allegedly maintains records
about gun owners indefinitely, in violation of federal and state law. 367 And, the
MIAC allegedly compiled information on individuals connected with a summer
camp, Seeds of Peace, which hosts foreign teenagers from international conflict
areas.368
The second shoe dropped a month later when an online “hactivist” group
published a trove of law enforcement documents obtained from servers owned by a
website developer called Netsential.369 The so-called “Blueleaks” hack included
numerous documents from the MIAC. Among other issues, these documents
revealed that the MIAC was closely monitoring Black Lives Matter (“BLM”)
protests across the state. The documents included compilations of the times and
places of protests, misleading information about an incident that occurred at one
protest, and the documents showed that the MIAC had shared unverified anti-BLM
information emanating from far right-wing Twitter accounts.370 The MIAC’s
monitoring of, and spread of misinformation about, BLM protests suggests a
“political nature” to MIAC’s surveillance practices. 371 The concern that the MIAC’s
monitoring of protests has political underpinnings carries particular weight in the
context of a movement sparked by police brutality, whose organizers have called for
defunding police departments, and who many law enforcement officials see as being
anti-police.
These revelations have prompted calls to reform or defund the MIAC. Brendan
McQuade, an Assistant Professor of Criminology at the University of Southern
Maine and author of a book on fusion centers, has called for the MIAC to be shut
down.372 State Representative Charlotte Warren, the Chair of the House’s Criminal
Justice Committee, has called for the MIAC to be defunded.373 And, the editorial
366. Id. ¶ 60.
367. Id. ¶ 64.
368. Id. ¶ 94; FAQs, SEEDS OF PEACE, https://www.seedsofpeace.org/faq/ [https://perma.cc/TS6R2WNX] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (describing the camp’s mission and programs).
369. See Andy Greenberg, Hack Brief: Anonymous Stole and Leaked a Megatrove of Police
Documents, WIRED , (June 22, 2020) https://www.wired.com/story/blueleaks-anonymous-lawenforcement-hack/ [https://perma.cc/XH6M-HSZY].
370. See Megan Gray, Hack Included Documents from Secretive Maine Police Unit, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD (June 26, 2020), https://www.pressherald.com/2020/06/26/hack-included-documentsfrom-secretive-maine-police-unit/ [https://perma.cc/J6L6-V5H6]; Nathan Bernard, Maine Spy Agency
Spread Far-Right Rumors of BLM Protest Violence, MAINER NEWS (July 7, 2020), https://mainernews.
com/maine-spy-agency-spread-far-right-rumors-of-blm-protest-violence/ [https://perma.cc/PNE68XF8]; Mike Tipping, Data Breach Exposes Activities of Maine’s Secretive Police Intelligence Agency,
ME. BEACON (June 26, 2020), https://mainebeacon.com/data-breach-exposes-activities-of-mainessecretive-police-intelligence-agency/ [https://perma.cc/XP66-WQU2].
371. Bernard, supra note 370 (quoting University of Southern Maine criminology professor Brendan
McQuade).
372. McQuade, supra note 358; see also Letter from Brendan McQuade, Assistant Professor, Univ.
S. Me., to Reps. Charlotte Warren, Thom Harnett, Craig Hickman, & Rachel Talbott Ross (June 25,
2020) (on file with author) (encouraging the representatives to investigate the MIAC and to shut it
down).
373. Dan Neumann, Maine’s Police Intelligence Center Sent Reports on Activists to Corporations,
ME. BEACON (July 16, 2020), https://mainebeacon.com/maines-police-intelligence-center-sent-reportson-activists-to-corporations/ [https://perma.cc/V5KX-DR22] (stating that Rep. Warren has called for the
MIAC’s $700,000 annual budget to be redirected to serve other needs).
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boards of the state’s two largest newspapers have both called for investigations and
reforms for the MIAC.374
I add my voice to this chorus. As this Article goes to print, Maine’s legislature
is considering a bill to defund the MIAC.375 Given the aforementioned abuses, the
legislature should pass this bill and the Governor should sign it into law. 376
IV. CONCLUSION
In the late 1960s, Maine began developing a body of privacy law to protect its
residents from privacy risks posed by the likes of eavesdroppers, harassers,
wiretappers, private investigators, and consumer reporting agencies. The state has
since expanded upon these foundational privacy protections to account for advances
in technology. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Maine criminalized unauthorized
computer access, prohibited cyberstalking, expanded the state’s criminal invasion of
privacy law, enacted a data breach law, prohibited the sale of consumers’ cell phone
records, and more. In the years since, Maine has enacted targeted reforms aimed at
specific privacy intrusions that have emerged during the current era of social media,
big data, and machine learning, curtailing the privacy risks caused by ISPs, education
technologies, drones, social media in employment, and unauthorized sexual images.
These recent reforms should be viewed as just the beginning of Maine’s efforts
to protect its residents against the day’s privacy threats. Personal information has
become a valuable resource that drives a significant portion of the country’s
economy. As with natural resources like oil, gas, and minerals, the titans of industry
have strong financial incentives to gather, process, market, and exploit more and
more of the new resource. If this industry continues to be left virtually unchecked,
the mass-commoditization of personal information will lead Mainers and other
Americans to experience unprecedented harms to their privacy.
This is no longer a case where “technology got a couple of steps ahead of us,”
as Senator Bartlett remarked while discussing the state’s Cellular Telephone
Customer Privacy Act.377 An entire system of economic production has gotten a

374. See Editorial Board, Our View: Oversight of Maine State Police ‘Fusion Center’ Way Overdue,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (May 20, 2020), https://www.pressherald.com/2020/05/20/our-viewoversight-for-maine-state-police-fusion-center-way-overdue [https://perma.cc/J5FK-9LAW]; Editorial
Board, Our View: Hearing on Maine Fusion Center Fails to Provide Answers, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD (June 26, 2020), https://www.pressherald.com/2020/06/26/our-view-hearing-on-fusion-centerfails-to-provide-answers-2/ [https://perma.cc/L3XL-66WK]; Editorial Board, Legislators Should
Continue Scrutiny of MIAC Activity, Budget, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (July 14, 2020), https://
bangordailynews.com/2020/07/14/opinion/editorials/legislators-should-continue-scrutiny-of-miacactivity-budget/ [https://perma.cc/7SS7-528D].
375. An Act to End the Maine Information and Analysis Center Program, L.D. 1278 (130th Legis.
2021).
376. In the event the Legislature decides not to defund the MIAC, I note that it is unclear what
existing legal authority the MIAC has to conduct intelligence analysis outside of the counter-terrorism
context. The executive order creating the MIAC refers only to “Homeland Security intelligence
information” and declares that the overall goal of the MIAC is “securing Maine’s citizens and
infrastructure from the threat of terrorism . . . .” Me. Exec. Order No. 24 FT 06/07 (Dec. 8, 2006).
Conspicuously absent from the executive order is any grant of authority to conduct general crimeprevention operations or to surveil domestic protest movements with no links to terrorism.
377. See remarks of Sen. Bartlett, supra note 112.
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couple steps ahead of us. Maine should correct this lag by enacting a general
consumer privacy law with the features described in this Article. Most importantly,
the law should endow a state agency with rulemaking authority over consumer
privacy issues such that the state can adapt its laws to changing industry practices
and new technologies. Maine should also continue to regulate specific threats posed
by emerging technologies. Facial recognition technology, biometric information,
smart-home devices, data brokers, and the MIAC all pose privacy threats that the
state should address through specific regulation, legislation, or executive action.
To be sure, this era’s privacy risks are national—and indeed global—in scope;
they require national and international solutions. But Maine should not leave its
residents’ privacy unguarded while waiting patiently for a federal response that may
not come or may be too little, too late.

